

8. POLICING AND SECURITY

Feelings of safety and security are an important aspect of social inclusion and integration. The poor social and economic conditions of many Muslims in Europe also mean that many live in areas with a high crime rate, while at the same time lacking the resources needed to protect themselves. While Muslims, like others, rely on the police for protection and maintaining order, the relationship between minorities and the police is not always easy. In several cities, incidents involving the police have been the trigger for unrest and rioting involving young Muslims. Since 11 September 2001, Muslims have come under increased police surveillance and at the same time have faced higher levels of hate crimes and violence directed at them. The chapter begins by looking at experiences of violence and hate crimes. It then examines levels of trust in the police and respondents' satisfaction with policing overall as well as discrimination experienced at the hands of the police. It ends by highlighting some of the initiatives taken in the 11 cities by the police to increase engagement, cooperation and recruitment to their ranks.

8.1 Violence and Hate Crime

Experiencing violence and crime makes a person feel insecure. When violence or crime is directed at a person due to their membership of a vulnerable group, whether based on ethnicity, race, religion or other grounds, this will lead to sensations of marginalisation and exclusion. In our study, 15 per cent of all respondents had been a victim of crime in the preceding 12 months. However, non-Muslim respondents (20 per cent) were more likely than Muslim respondents (11 per cent) to have been victims of crime. In the Muslim sample, European-born Muslim men were more likely than men born abroad or women to have been victims of crime.

Almost a quarter of Muslim respondents (23 per cent) and 17 per cent of non-Muslim respondents interpreted the crime they experienced to be a "hate crime", that is a crime motivated by discrimination. Muslim and non-Muslim respondents differed greatly when it came to reporting hate crimes to the police: 36 per cent of Muslims reported the crime to the police, compared with 59 per cent of non-Muslims.

The need to improve on the reporting of hate crime is recognised in some cities. In Copenhagen, the city council established a website on hate crime on which members of religious minorities are able to register instances of hate crimes.³⁴⁴ By March 2009, it had received over 200 complaints. In the London Borough of Waltham Forest, the council explicitly marks out religious hatred as a hate crime alongside racism and homophobia.³⁴⁵

³⁴⁴ *Politiken*, 28 March 2009.

³⁴⁵ London Borough of Waltham Forest, "Hate crime: common questions", 2009, available at <http://www.walthamforest.gov.uk/index/safety/hate-crime/common-questions.htm> (accessed November 2009).

8.2 Trust in the Police

The police are a key social institution in the exercise of the state's power over the individual. Trust in the police is therefore important for the legitimacy of police action. High levels of trust are important for encouraging reporting of crime to the police and in ensuring cooperation with them. Analysis of data from the European Social Survey found that levels of trust in the police vary across different European countries and that, in general, "older people seem to have more trust in the police than the young, and that women have more trust in the police than men [...] those working at home have more trust in the police than those in waged work and, correspondingly, the unemployed trust the police less than those in waged work".³⁴⁶ Research from the United States suggests that ethnic-minority groups have lower levels of trust in the police than the general population.³⁴⁷ Research in Belgium, however, shows that once socio-economic background is taken into account, the levels of trust in the police found among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are no different from their Belgian counterparts.³⁴⁸

The majority of respondents (58 per cent) in the OSI survey have either "a lot" (14 per cent) or "a fair amount" (44 per cent) of trust in the police; 31 per cent had very little and 9 per cent no trust at all.

Table 100. Level of trust in the police (F11.1)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A lot		14.1%	12.9%	13.5%
A fair amount		41.3%	47.2%	44.2%
Not very much		33.7%	28.5%	31.1%
Not at all		8.6%	9.6%	9.1%
Don't know		2.3%	1.9%	2.1%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1088	2197

Source: Open Society Institute data

³⁴⁶ Juha Tapio Kääriäinen, "Trust in the Police in 16 European Countries: A Multilevel Analysis", *European Journal of Criminology*, 4, 2007, pp. 409–435, p. 424 (hereafter, Kääriäinen, "Trust in the Police in 16 European Countries").

³⁴⁷ Tom Tyler "Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and Confidence in the Police", *Policing Quarterly* 8(3), 2005, pp. 322–324.

³⁴⁸ M. Van Craen and J. Ackaert, *Het vertrouwen van allochtonen en autochtonen in de politie: geen zwart-wit verhaal* (Trust of minorities and majorities in the police: not black and white), Eerste Criminologisch Forum, Gent, 2008 (in Dutch), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

Religion alone does not appear to be a significant variable in relation to trust in the police. Non-Muslim respondents (60.1 per cent) were marginally more likely to feel an overall sense of trust in the police than Muslim respondents (55.4 per cent). However, respondents bearing visible signs of their identity had greater trust in the police than those without.

**Table 101. Level of trust in the police
(breakdown by visible display of religious identity) (F11)**

		Visible signs of religious identity		
		Yes	No	Total
Muslim	A lot	15.9%	13.0%	14.1%
	A fair amount	42.6%	40.5%	41.3%
	Not very much	32.6%	34.3%	33.7%
	Not at all	5.9%	10.2%	8.6%
	Don't know	2.9%	2.0%	2.3%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	408	699	1107
Non-Muslim	A lot	21.7%	12.5%	12.9%
	A fair amount	60.9%	46.4%	47.0%
	Not very much	15.2%	29.2%	28.6%
	Not at all	2.2%	9.8%	9.5%
	Don't know	–	2.0%	1.9%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	46	1038	1084

Source: Open Society Institute data

Among Muslim respondents, the difference was small: 59 per cent of those with a visible religious identity expressed trust the police compared with 54 per cent of those without. The difference was much more significant in the case of non-Muslims (83 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively).³⁴⁹ Neither did levels of trust differ for Muslim respondents according to whether the respondents regarded themselves as actively practising their faith or not.

³⁴⁹ This figure should be treated with caution as the actual number of non-Muslim respondents with a visible religious identity is low.

Both gender and age make a difference to levels of trust.³⁵⁰

Table 103. Level of trust in the police (breakdown by gender) (F11.1)

		Male	Female	Total
Muslim	A lot	11.3%	16.9%	14.1%
	A fair amount	40.1%	42.5%	41.3%
	Not very much	34.6%	32.8%	33.7%
	Not at all	11.1%	6.0%	8.6%
	Don't know	2.9%	1.8%	2.3%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	558	551	1109
Non-Muslim	A lot	13.6%	12.2%	12.9%
	A fair amount	50.3%	44.3%	47.2%
	Not very much	25.3%	31.4%	28.5%
	Not at all	9.6%	9.5%	9.6%
	Don't know	1.2%	2.6%	1.9%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	521	567	1088

Source: Open Society Institute data

Muslim women (59 per cent) are more likely to trust the police than Muslim men (51 per cent). The opposite is true for non-Muslims: 64 per cent of men say they trust the police as opposed to 57 per cent of women. In the Muslim sample, levels of trust in the police increase exponentially with age: 54 per cent of Muslims aged below 20 say they have confidence in the police; for those over 60 the figure rises to 64 per cent.

Trust in the police also differs by employment status.³⁵¹

³⁵⁰ See Table 102. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

³⁵¹ See Table 104. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Among both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, those unemployed or enrolled on a government training programme are among the least likely to trust the police. Muslims working unpaid in the family business are also among the least likely to trust the police. This is consistent with US research, which found that poverty and economic exclusion lead to lower levels of trust in the police.³⁵²

Both Muslims and non-Muslims who have been victims of crime lasting the preceding 12 months are less likely to have trust in the police than those who have not. In the Muslim sample, 50 per cent of those who trust the police said they had been a victim, compared with 56 per cent of those who had not. In the non-Muslim sample, these figures were 50 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively. This is consistent with findings from the European Social Survey.³⁵³ Very few respondents indicated whether they were satisfied with the police's response (11 Muslims and 23 non-Muslims) but those who answered "no" were significantly more likely to feel a lack of confidence in the police.

The results of controlling for country of birth and gender are that non-Muslim men born in Europe have the greatest levels of trust in the police (65 per cent); however, Muslim women born abroad were the most likely (19 per cent) to have "a lot" of trust in the police. Muslim men born in Europe have the lowest levels of trust in the police (46 per cent), were the least likely (7 per cent) to have "a lot" of trust and most likely to have "no trust".³⁵⁴

In the OSI focus group discussion in Hamburg, it was suggested that many Muslims who are migrants have a high level of trust in the police in Germany, because they compare German police with the police in their countries of origin, and their expectations of the police are shaped by their experiences there. In particular, those with negative experiences of police corruption in their countries of origin tended to have more positive views of German police as they are not viewed as corrupt. Young male and female Muslims commented: "Most have a migration background and in their home country you cannot really trust the police. They formed a positive opinion of German police officers." Perceptions of Germans as professionals who will do their job according to the rules are also cited as a reason for trusting the police. This is consistent with data from the survey which find that those born abroad (15 per cent) are slightly more likely than those born in the EU (11 per cent) to have "a lot" of trust in the police.

Analysis of the OSI focus group discussions shows that across most cities, perception and experiences of racism and unfair treatment at the hands of the police were cited most often as the basis for distrust of them. The focus group discussion in Berlin suggests that even a single negative incident involving discrimination which goes back

³⁵² J. Frank, B. V. Smith, and K. J. Novak (2005) "Exploring the basis of citizens' attitudes toward the police", *Police Quarterly* 8, 206–228.

³⁵³ Kääriäinen, "Trust in the Police in 16 European Countries", p. 427.

³⁵⁴ See Table 105. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

many years continues to shape such perceptions. The vividness with which such incidents are recalled during the focus group discussions suggests that it will be difficult for any subsequent positive contact to remove the perceptions.

In Marseille, questions of trust in the police are further complicated by the city's relationship to France's colonial past in Algeria. In particular, many *pieds noirs* (former European colonists of North Africa) arrived in Marseille at the end of the 1950s and took up positions in the police and other security-related professions. Among focus group participants over the age of 30, strong memories remain of how some of these police officers from the former colonies directed their anger and feelings of revenge towards North Africans, particularly Algerian migrants, in Marseille:

Regarding the question of the *pieds noirs* officers, actually I have lived in Le Panier for a very long time, near the bishop's palace; its called the "pieds noirs" area, there are bars where the cops go and talk among themselves; always the same ones. I used to drink coffee there. From where I am standing, Marseille is a paradoxical town. Its either very friendly or very racist in the sense that the primary racism is, "he's an Arab, he's almost inferior to me, almost". Because I'm convinced that the people who believe the Arab man to be inferior to them don't even know that this is the definition of racism; one race being superior to another or the very concept of race. I am often asked "what race are you?". In Marseille its "what's your race", "so you're of the Arab race". You would have almost thought that we were animals.³⁵⁵

Table 106. Satisfaction with policing (G1.5)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Very satisfied	7.4%	5.5%	6.5%
Fairly satisfied	35.3%	33.2%	34.3%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	23.5%	27.1%	25.3%
Fairly dissatisfied	18.7%	17.0%	17.8%
Very dissatisfied	11.4%	11.6%	11.5%
Don't know	3.7%	5.6%	4.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1089

Source: Open Society Institute data

³⁵⁵ Stakeholder interview, Marseille, 2009.

8.3 Levels of Satisfaction with Policing

While a majority of OSI respondents trusted the police, only a minority (43 per cent) were either “very” or “fairly” satisfied with policing in their local area; 30 per cent were either “very” or “fairly” dissatisfied, and 24 per cent were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. The views of Muslim and non-Muslim residents did not vary a great deal. The OSI focus group discussions convey that, for some, dissatisfaction centres on the behaviour of police officers, with complaints ranging from claims that they are impolite and rude through to discriminatory behaviours such as verbal insults and in one case physical assault.

However, for other focus group participants, the dissatisfaction concerned the lack of police action on particular issues. The failure of police to address drugs problems in local areas was frequently cited as an issue, as well as the lack of visible policing. When asked what needed to improve, more police on the street was a consistent answer. Others wanted more neighbourhood police officers who had direct contact with citizens. It was felt that this was needed to improve interaction, communication and trust. In London, the dissatisfaction stemmed from feelings that insufficient efforts were being made to deal with crime when it was reported:

We feel that the Police just do their basic duty i.e. come and write the report and that’s it. After that they did not console us, nothing; they said nothing [...] As the burglars were standing on the road before they came in from the front door; they should have asked neighbours if they saw anything because my daughter was not home but they were home. The Police did not do any investigation.

When my house got broken into ... when they come in, they take all the things that they can take, like all the fingerprints or any evidence or anything that they can, but the outcome is, there is no outcome.

8.4 Discrimination

Police discrimination, also called “ethnic profiling”, describes the use by law enforcement officers of generalisations grounded in ethnicity, race, religion or national origin – rather than objective evidence or individual behaviour – as the basis for making law enforcement and/or investigative decisions about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity.³⁵⁶ Ethnic profiling is manifested most often in police officers’ decisions about whom to stop, ask for identity papers, question, search and sometimes arrest. Ethnic profiling may result from the racist behaviour of individual police officers, or from the institutionalised bias ingrained in many police forces. The

³⁵⁶ Open Society Justice Initiative, *Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Discriminatory and Ineffective*, Open Society Institute, Budapest and New York, 2009, available at: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/equality_citizenship/articles_publications/publications/profiling_20090526 (accessed November 2009, hereafter, OSJI, *Ethnic Profiling in the EU*).

result of ethnic profiling may be stopping, searching and even arresting innocent people; overlooking criminals who do not fit the established profile; undermining the rule of law and perceptions of police fairness; stigmatising entire communities; and alienating people who could work with the police to reduce crime and prevent terrorism.

Almost 10 per cent of Muslim (101 individuals) OSI respondents reported suffering discrimination at the hands of the police. Of these, almost a third were from the Antwerp and Berlin samples (17 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively). The city with the lowest proportion of affected Muslims was Leicester, with 3 per cent. Of the 101 Muslims, two-thirds were male and one-third female.

Table 107. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (A4)

	Frequency	Per cent
Amsterdam	7	6.9
Antwerp	17	16.8
Berlin	13	12.9
Copenhagen	9	8.9
Hamburg	9	8.9
Leicester	3	3.0
Marseille	9	8.9
Paris	8	7.9
Rotterdam	10	9.9
Stockholm	7	6.9
Waltham Forest	9	8.9
Total	101	100.0

Source: Open Society Institute data

Table 108. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (breakdown by age and gender) (H8)

Age	Male	Female	Total	
< 20	9.9%	3.0%	12.9%	
20 – 29	30.7%	12.9%	43.6%	
30 – 39	10.9%	11.9%	22.8%	
40 – 49	8.9%	5.0%	13.9%	
50 – 59	4.0%	–	4.0%	
60 +	3.0%	–	3.0%	
Total	Per cent	67.3%	32.7%	100.0%
	Count	68	33	101

Source: Open Society Institute data

There is a clear link between the age of respondents and experiences of discrimination from the police. The majority of those claiming unfair treatment tend to be aged under 30 (56 per cent in total of which 13 per cent are aged under 20 and 44 per cent aged 20–29).

Table 109. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (breakdown by age) (H8)

Age	Frequency	Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
< 20	13	12.9	12.9
20 – 29	44	43.6	56.4
30 – 39	23	22.8	79.2
40 – 49	14	13.9	93.1
50 – 59	4	4.0	97.0
60 +	3	3.0	100.0
Total	101	100.0	

Source: Open Society Institute data

Further analysis showed that the group most likely to report experiences of discrimination from the police are Muslim men aged 20–29 years.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁷ See Table 108. for breakdown of data.

30 per cent of Muslims claiming unfair treatment at the hands of the police carried visible signs of their religious affiliation.

Table 110. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (breakdown by display of visible religious identity and gender) (H8)

		Male	Female	Total
Muslim – Hair covering		4.0%	17.8%	21.8%
Muslim – Face covering		0%	1.0%	1.0%
Muslim – Body covering		0%	2.0%	2.0%
Muslim – Beard/Moustache		9.9%	0%	9.9%
Muslim – Religious symbols		2.0%	2.0%	4.0%
None		56.4%	12.9%	69.3%
Total	Per cent	67.3%	32.7%	100.0%
	Count	68	33	101

Source: Open Society Institute data

Further analysis showed that the majority of these were women who wore a headscarf (18 per cent). Of the affected respondents, 79 per cent said they actively practised Islam.

Over half (54 per cent) of Muslims who have experienced discrimination at the hands of the police have completed secondary school, while a further 22 per cent have obtained a university degree.

Table 111. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (Muslims, by highest level of education completed) (H8)

	Frequency	Per cent
No formal education	6	5.9
Primary	19	18.8
Secondary	54	53.5
University	22	21.8
Total	101	100.0

Source: Open Society Institute data

Nearly a quarter have few or no formal qualifications. Comparing these results with the average educational achievement of the entire Muslim sample shows that those with primary and secondary education are marginally over-represented in the sample of Muslims discriminated against by the police, while those with a university degree or no qualifications at all fall below their respective averages.

At first glance, Muslims in full-time employment, education or who are unemployed are most likely to be those who say they have experienced discrimination at the hands of the police.

Table 112. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (Muslims, by employment status) (H8)

	Frequency	Per cent
Full-time employee	31	30.7
Part-time employee	2	2.0
Self-employed	7	6.9
Working unpaid in family business	1	1.0
Retired	4	4.0
On government employment or training programme	2	2.0
Unemployed and looking for work	20	19.8
Student	19	18.8
Looking after home or family	6	5.9
Permanently sick or disabled	1	1.0
Other	8	7.9
Total	101	100.0

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, when comparing these statistics with those from the overall Muslim sample, it can be seen that Muslims who are unemployed are significantly over-represented at 20 per cent of the discriminated group, despite being only 11 per cent of the entire Muslim sample.

Table 113. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (overall Muslim sample, by employment status) (II4)

Entire Muslim sample	Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Full-time employee	306	27.6	27.7	27.7
Part-time employee	164	14.8	14.8	42.5
Self-employed	60	5.4	5.4	47.9
Working unpaid in family business	7	0.6	0.6	48.6
Retired	64	5.8	5.8	54.3
On government employment or training programme	21	1.9	1.9	56.2
Unemployed and looking for work	116	10.5	10.5	66.7
Student	156	14.1	14.1	80.8
Looking after home or family	102	9.2	9.2	90.1
Permanently sick or disabled	36	3.2	3.3	93.3
Other	74	6.7	6.7	100.0
Total	1106	99.6	100.0	
Missing	4	0.4		
Total	1110	100.0		

Source: Open Society Institute data

These data support the findings of the Open Society Justice Initiative, in the recent report *Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Discriminatory and Ineffective*.³⁵⁸ Ethnic profiling did not emerge as a post-9/11 response to terrorism. Evidence clearly indicates that police throughout Europe have long engaged in ethnic profiling of immigrant and minority communities. Despite a dearth of quantitative information on policing and ethnicity in most of Europe, the data that exist indicate that ethnic profiling is widespread. Since the 9/11 attacks, interest in and the use of ethnic profiling have grown sharply.

³⁵⁸ OSJI, *Ethnic Profiling in the EU*.

In the UK (the only EU Member State to systematically gather ethnic data on police practices), data show dramatic increases in stops and searches of British Asians following terrorist attacks: stops of persons of Asian descent conducted under counterterrorism powers increased threefold following the 9/11 attacks, and fivefold after the July 2005 London Underground bomb attacks. In Germany, police have used preventive powers to conduct mass identity checks outside major mosques.³⁵⁹ In France and Italy, raids on homes, business premises and mosques – often lacking a basis in specific evidence – have targeted Muslims, particularly those considered religiously observant. Numerous studies since 2001 have documented “a growing perception among Muslim leaders and communities across Europe that they are being stopped, questioned and searched not on the basis of evidence and reasonable suspicion but on the basis of ‘looking Muslim’.”³⁶⁰

In the light of the above data it is not surprising that policing was a particularly heated issue in focus groups with young people, particularly in Antwerp where many participants had had contact with the police in the past few years. They felt harassed and wrongfully accused. As one respondent states: “[As a Moroccan in Antwerp] you are guilty until proven innocent”. Identity checks were a particular bone of contention:

I experienced it myself many times. They just do your identity check [the police stops a person and asks for their identity card which everyone in Belgium is obliged to carry with them on all times]. I don't mind an identity check, this is normal. [But] then you give your identity card and they say: yes, you are up to something. I'm on my way home or to a friend or to my nephew. Then they say: you are up to something, I can see it. They don't even do their job. They can't say: I can see you are up to something. That just isn't police work anymore, that's just showing “I'm the boss here.” I can take you away whenever I want to.

[Interviewer:] But when you say identity control is normal ... how do you mean is normal?

[Man 5:] Yes, I mean it's not so bad when they say give me your identity card. For identification or whatever. But when they say: you are up to something. You have to have some evidence before you can say something like that. You have to think first before you say something.

[Man 4:] You're suspect until proven innocent.³⁶¹

The discussion revealed the way in which identity checks are regarded by young Muslims as a normal part of life: “I don't mind an identity check, this is normal.” During the field research for this project, riots involving young Muslims broke out in

³⁵⁹ Arun Kundnani, *Analysis: The War on Terror Leads to Racial Profiling*, Institute for Race Relations, IRR News, London, 7 July 2004; Vickram Dodd, “Surge in Stop and Search of Asian People After July 7,” *The Guardian*, 24 December 2005, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/dec/24/terrorism.race> (accessed November 2009).

³⁶⁰ EU Accession Monitoring Program, *Monitoring Minority Protection in EU Member States: Overview*, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2002, p. 53.

³⁶¹ OSI focus group, Antwerp.

the Norrebro district of Copenhagen. The riots followed protests by young ethnic-minority people against police harassment; they appear to have been triggered by stories of police manhandling an elderly man in the street. Some of those involved in the disturbance published an article in the daily paper *Politiken* in which ethnic profiling of young people from minorities was identified as a key underlying cause of disquiet with the police. This also emerged strongly in the focus group discussions.

In France, the paucity of ethnic statistical data collected on law enforcement activities makes it difficult to identify institutional racism in the police force. Yet, a recent study by the Open Society Justice Initiative in collaboration with Fabien Jobard and René Lévy, researchers with the National Centre for Scientific Research (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) in France, under the technical supervision of Lamberth Consulting, examined whether and to what extent law enforcement officers stop individuals based on their appearance.

Examining five locations in and around the Gare du Nord and Châtelet-Les Halles rail stations, all important transit points in central Paris that are also the sites of heavy police activity, *Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop-and-Search Practices in Paris*³⁶² gathered data on police stops carried out by national police and customs officers, including information on the ethnicity, age, gender, clothing and bags carried by the persons who were stopped. This study, which generated unique information on over 500 police stops, is the first to gather the quantitative data necessary to identify and detect patterns of ethnic profiling in France.

The study confirmed that police stops and identity checks in Paris are principally based on the appearance of the person stopped, rather than on their behaviour or actions. Persons perceived to be ethnic minorities were disproportionately stopped. The results show that persons perceived to be “black” (of sub-Saharan African or Caribbean origin) and “Arab” (of North African or Maghrebian origin) were stopped at proportionally much higher rates than persons perceived to be “white” (of western European origin). Across the five observations sites, blacks were overall six times more likely than whites to be stopped; the site-specific rates of disproportionality ranged from 3.3 to 11.5. Arabs were generally 7.6 times more likely than whites to be stopped, although again, the specific rate of disproportionality across the five locations ranged from 1.8 and 14.8. Follow-up interviews with the individuals who were stopped also suggest that these two groups regularly experience far more police stops than whites.

An equally important determinant of who was stopped by police for identity checks was the style of clothing worn by the individuals in question. Although people wearing clothing typically associated with French youth culture (including “hip-hop”, “tecktonic”, “punk” and “gothic” styles) made up only 10 per cent of the population

³⁶² Open Society Justice Initiative, *Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop and Search Practices in Paris*, Open Society Institute, Budapest and New York, 2009, available in French and English at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/equality_citizenship/articles_publications/publications/search_20090630 (accessed November 2009).

available to be stopped by police, they made up 47 per cent of those who were actually stopped. The study revealed a strong relationship between the ethnicity of the person stopped, the style of clothing worn and their propensity to be stopped; fully two-thirds of the individuals dressed in youth culture clothing were also classified as belonging to an ethnic-minority group. It is likely that police consider both belonging to an ethnic-minority group and wearing youth clothing to be closely tied to a propensity to commit crimes or infractions. Although persons from all ethnic backgrounds reported police behaviour to be generally polite or neutral, those who were most targeted for police stops and identity checks – blacks and Arabs – nevertheless expressed anger and frustration at what they believed was a pattern of being singled out for stops and searches. In the absence of legitimate policing strategies that explain these stops in other than ethnic terms, the behaviour of the French police documented in this study is highly consistent with ethnic profiling.

In Hamburg, a Muslim woman recalled a story about her brother:

He was just finishing gymnasium [high school], was 18, 19 and had a full beard. He was in the underground and forgot his ticket. He came from school with a lot of colleagues and had a rucksack full of books with him. The ticket inspectors asked for his name, because he forgot his pass. The others confirmed his name. He realised that they are afraid of the rucksack. The moment he opened the rucksack, they jumped back and were frightened. He showed them his books, but they didn't believe him and took him to the police station. There he was confronted with insults because of 9/11, the terror attacks, because he has a full beard and he is dark.³⁶³

There are examples of attempts to address prejudice and discrimination in the police force. In France the National Police Force launched specific training for new police officers to give them an elementary and basic knowledge of Islam, the history of immigration and the sociology of the suburbs. During this training sociologists, trainers and policemen recount their personal experiences. This type of training was piloted in early 2000, at the National School of Police of Marseille (School of Sainte-Marthe). In Leicester, community training for new officers includes a day devoted to visiting places of worship so that officers are familiar with the layout and structure of the space and understand the leadership style and governance of such places. Senior officers undergo level-2 training, which includes looking at different schools of thought in Islam. The training is also aimed at ensuring that communities are able to engage more effectively with the diverse communities they serve. In the London Borough of Waltham Forest, the council ensures that all frontline policing staff undertake faith-awareness training.³⁶⁴

³⁶³ OSI focus group, Hamburg.

³⁶⁴ London Borough of Waltham Forest, *Draft: Working Together, Living Together, Being Together – Waltham Forest Community Cohesion Strategy 2008–2011*, 2008, p.8, available at: [http://www1.walthamforest.gov.uk/ModernGov/Published/C00000287/M00001812/AI00009757/\\$9AppendixJuly08CommunityCohesionStrategyv2.docA.ps.pdf](http://www1.walthamforest.gov.uk/ModernGov/Published/C00000287/M00001812/AI00009757/$9AppendixJuly08CommunityCohesionStrategyv2.docA.ps.pdf) (accessed November 2009).

8.5 Police and Community Engagement

Across the different cities, there are examples of policies and initiatives that are seeking to increase community trust and engagement with the police. There are examples of successful partnerships with community organisations and support for community-led initiatives. An example of the latter is the public funding for the “Neighbourhood Fathers” project in the Netherlands. This started out as an initiative of a group of Moroccan fathers in response to concerns about by confrontations between the police and young Moroccan men. The fathers group decided to patrol the streets to prevent further trouble. Despite initial scepticism, there is now state support for this project. In Leicester, there is a Police Advisory Group on Racial Incidents (PAGRI), which was set up to advise senior officers on critical incidents. Members of the advisory board are involved with the police in so-called hydra exercises, in which hypothetical situations are discussed to see how a community scenario might turn into a high-risk incident. Interviews with community groups in the city also suggest that even work that has emerged as a result of policing for counterterrorism has strengthened relationships between community institutions and the police. The London Borough of Waltham Forest has instituted a Youth Independent Advisory Group (YIAG),³⁶⁵ which has devised and delivered stop-and-search training for new police recruits, demonstrating what makes a good search from a young person’s perspective.

There are also examples in several cities of increased collaboration between the police and mosques. The police in Amsterdam, for example, worked with local mosques to disseminate information about their actions after an incident involving a shooting of a Moroccan youth who attacked police with a knife. Police in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam were also active in reducing tensions in the weeks preceding the release of Geert Wilders’ film *Fitna*. In Amsterdam, the police organised a meeting before the release of the film, to ensure that the local Muslim community understood their legal position, including their right to file a complaint about it. In Berlin, contacts between the police and mosque associations have been taking place through the development of “cooperation agreements”. In 2003, the local police in the district of Neukölln, together with the local mosque association, started a programme called “TiK” (Transfer of Intercultural Competencies). This aimed to put mosque and police officers from the different districts into contact with each other and develop national guidelines for the police about how to act in their contacts with mosques and Muslims. The guidelines provide basic knowledge about Islam and Muslim cultural sensibilities, so as to help prevent conflict emerging as a result of misunderstandings.

Growing recognition of the importance of community engagement has led to the development of structures or mechanisms for community based policing. In Hamburg,

³⁶⁵ This is a group of 15 to 21 year olds from across the borough who works in partnership with the police and the Council to proactively identify safety issues in their community and to act as a sounding board on local and national policies.

Muslim roundtable participants referred to their positive experiences with BUNABE³⁶⁶ neighbourhood policing in areas with a high proportion of Muslim and migrant residents, such as Wilhelmsburg, Steilshoop or Billstedt. In the UK, neighbourhood policing teams are attached to local areas, and there is increasing deployment of Police and Community Support Officers (PCSOs). The latter wear uniforms similar to those of the police but do not have the same powers. The London Borough of Waltham Forest council has appointed a Metropolitan Police Faith Officer to engage directly with the Muslim community.³⁶⁷ In 2000, France introduced Security Assistants (AS) and Local Agents of Mediation (ALMS). In the Netherlands, there are neighbourhood directors and “street coaches”. The latter are often kick-boxers or martial arts experts who patrol the area on bikes and are concerned with antisocial behaviour. They report problems to social work home teams who visit individuals at home and in the case of young people talk to the family and parents about their behaviour. The OSI research suggests that individuals from minority groups have a more visible presence in such roles. In Slotervaart, Amsterdam, for example, two of the nine neighbourhood directors are from non-western minorities, as are many of the “street coaches” and the home teams. In Leicester it is reported that a significant proportion of those recruited to work as PCSOs are from ethnic minorities.

The increased visibility and presence of individuals from minorities in these roles is an important acknowledgement that public institutions and services are better able to meet the needs of diverse local communities if their workforce also reflects that diversity. There is, however, a danger that individuals from ethnic minorities become concentrated in roles which are not viewed in the same light as mainstream policing roles and that senior policing positions remain closed to them. Community-based or focused policing roles are important for developing trust but there still remains a need to recruit ethnic minorities into the mainstream police.

8.6 Diversity in the Police Force

Across the different cities, there is recognition of the need for greater diversity in the police force. There are no data on the number of Muslims working as police officers in different cities, but there are data on officers from minority backgrounds, which provides an indication of the extent to which different cities are succeeding in recruiting a more diverse police force. Some cities have been more successful at recruiting from ethnic-minority groups than others. For example, 6.5 per cent of police officers in the Netherlands are from minority groups, while 12 per cent of officers in the Amsterdam Amstelland force are from ethnic-minority groups, and in Rotterdam

³⁶⁶ Short for *Bürgerlicher Beamter*, an officer close to citizens.

³⁶⁷ London Borough of Waltham Forest, *Community Cohesion Strategy Action Plan Year Two 2009/10*, 2009, p15, available at <http://www.walthamforest.gov.uk/cohesion-action-planning> (accessed November 2009, hereafter Borough of Waltham Forest, *Community Cohesion Strategy Action Plan Year Two*).

the figure is 13 per cent.³⁶⁸ This city's aim is to increase this to 20 per cent. In Leicester, 6 per cent of police were from ethnic-minority groups in 2008. In contrast, less than 2 per cent of officers in Hamburg are from ethnic minorities, although in other regions of Germany, like Nordrhein-Westfalen, minorities account for 7.6 per cent of police officers.³⁶⁹ In Antwerp, less than 2 per cent of police officers are from ethnic minorities.³⁷⁰

Various initiatives have been taken to improve recruitment. In Rotterdam, 60 internships have been offered to future police officers at Hogeschool Inholland (HBO) that are targeted at non-native students. In Leicester, careers in policing are advertised through police-organised community sporting events, in community centres (including mosques) and at key community events such as the Hindu Diwali festival and the Caribbean Carnival. The police are also careful to ensure that recruitment posters are placed in areas with high BME populations and show pictures of people from visible minority groups. In Paris, the police created a "security and citizenship" forum in policing schools to encourage and support applicants from minority backgrounds in 2005. In 2007, a police superintendent's exam preparation course was launched. It aims to encourage applicants from low income families by providing extra support preparation for police entrance exams.

Such initiatives, however, cannot succeed when there is a particularly negative view of the police held by young people from minority groups. In Antwerp, for example, a €600,000 advertising campaign resulted in only one recruit from a minority background. A discussion on whether to join the police that took place in a Berlin focus group highlighted the way in which negative stories about experiences with the police shape community perceptions and feelings about joining the police. Thus, even in cities where recruitment rates for ethnic-minority groups are good, this can be undermined if those who join soon leave because of experiences of discrimination.

Stakeholder interviews in Marseille suggest that Islamophobia and racism persists in police unions:

One day I went to the police station. I found myself in front of the trade union notice board. There was a poster of the National Union of Police Officers on which was marked: "No to the Islamisation of the National Police Force!". I found that disgraceful. Basically, it was written: "It is out of the question that Muslim police officers force their mosques onto us inside police stations". They

³⁶⁸ Politie Regio Amsterdam Amstelland, *Jaarverslag, 2007* (in Dutch), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*.

³⁶⁹ Daniela Hunold, *Migranten in der Polizei. Zwischen politischer Programmatik und Organisationswirklichkeit* (Migrants in the Police. Between Political Programmatic and Organisational Reality), Frankfurt, Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2008.

³⁷⁰ J. Meijer, "Antwerpen wil minder maar betere moskeeën" (Antwerp, less but better Mosques), *De Morgen*, 5 May 2008 (in Dutch), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

were attacking their own colleagues with Muslim backgrounds. I had the psychological shock of my life. I said “its not possible”. They were attacking Muslim police officers, saying that it is them who are the infiltrated agents of Islamism, who would like us to build mosques in police stations.³⁷¹

In Amsterdam, for example, it has been suggested that a fifth of police officers from minorities are considering leaving the police force.³⁷² A study by Hamburg University comparing recruitment practices in Germany and the UK recommends establishing an Ethnic Minority Police Association, because it is important for ethnic-minority officers to have support, affirmation and a voice through an official institution within the police force that strengthens their rights.³⁷³ The OSI research in Marseille suggests that the city is proof that a city can change minority groups’ perceptions of joining its police force. During 1970–1980, many North African families saw joining the French national police force as a betrayal of their personal story and their identities (Arabic, Muslim, “resistant” to French colonisation). This is no longer the case; today, joining the national or local police force is a sign of professional success.

8.7 Key Findings

It is critical to ensure accurate reporting and recording of hate crime. The high levels of trust in the police provide a good base from which to develop initiatives to improve reporting. However, it needs to be recognised that the general high levels of trust exist alongside low levels of trust among young European-born Muslim males. This group also appears to experience the greatest amount of discrimination and unfair treatment in the hands of the police. Trust can be lost through a single bad incident that leaves a lasting impression on an individual. At the same time, the experience of Marseille suggests that over time, even the most complex and fraught relations between the community and the police can improve. There are a wide range of initiatives that aim to improve communication and engagement with Muslim communities. Engagement will also improve when the police force begins to reflect the ethnic, religious and cultural diversity of the community it serves. Some cities are developing imaginative ways to improve engagement with communities, as well as effective strategies for recruiting and retaining police officers from minority communities.

³⁷¹ Marseille stakeholder interview, April 2009.

³⁷² “Allochtone agenten twijfelen over baan” (Ethnic Minority Police Doubts About Job), available at <http://www.inoverheid.nl/artikel/nieuws/1105430/allochtone-agenten-twijfelen-over-baan.html> (in Dutch, accessed November 2009).

³⁷³ Karakus, Oksan, “Recruitment of Ethnic Minority Police Officers. Ethnic Minority Recruitment from a Multi-Cultural Perspective in England and Germany”, Hamburg, University of Hamburg, Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Departement Wirtschaft und Politik, Institut für Kriminologische Sozialforschung, 2008, p. 65.