

5. EMPLOYMENT

Participation in the labour market remains at the heart of economic integration, which in its turn is a powerful driver of social integration. CBP principle no. 3 underlines this point. It notes that “employment is a key part of the integration process” and is central to participation. Economic integration requires not only opportunities for employment, but employment in the mainstream rather than a segmented or segregated labour market and in jobs that are commensurate with an individual’s skills and qualifications. This chapter begins by looking at data on labour-market participation. It then examines the role of different barriers Muslims face in accessing and fully participating in the labour market. Some of these barriers arise from the position of most Muslims in western Europe as migrants or the descendants of migrants; others, however, relate specifically to Muslims as a group.

5.1 Labour-market Participation

Labour-market participation can be measured in various ways, including economic activity rates, employment rates and unemployment rates. As with education, labour-market data are rarely collected on the basis of religion. Data on ethnic minorities, migrants and foreign nationals provide a limited indication of the position of Muslims by means of data on minority groups that are predominantly Muslim. A review of the labour-market integration of ethnic minorities in Europe, carried out by the Institute for the Study of Labour, collected labour-market data on minority groups in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. These data show that the labour-market participation rate among groups that are predominantly Muslim (Turks, Moroccans, Iraqis, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) is lower than that of the majority population. The review concludes that ethnic minorities “typically have significantly higher unemployment rates, lower labour income, and they are less likely to find and keep their jobs than the majority population”.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ K. F. Zimmerman *et al.*, *Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities*, IZA Research Report No 16, 2008. p. 11 (hereafter, Zimmerman *et al.*, *Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities*).

Table 63. Labour market situation of selected ethnic minorities and natives/total population in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK

Country	Majority/Minority group	Labour Market participation rate ¹⁸⁶	Unemployment rate	Hourly wage ¹⁸⁷
Belgium ¹⁸⁸	Autochthonous Belgians	65	–	–
	New Belgians	52	–	–
	Turks	29	–	–
	Moroccans	29	–	–
Denmark	Total population	76.3	4.5	278.3
	Turks	62.2	17.8	170.7
	Iraqis	37.7	26.9	138.4
	Bosnia-Herzegovinians	57.2	12.9	177.4
	Other non-western	55.8	28	164.8
The Netherlands ¹⁸⁹	Dutch majority	78	9	10.4
	Turks	53	21	7.1
	Moroccans	51	27	6.9
United Kingdom	White majority population	81.8	3.8	11.8
	Pakistani	55.2	12.8	10.2
	Bangladeshi	48.7	19.4	10.1

Source: Zimmerman *et al.*, *Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities*, p. 15.

¹⁸⁶ For the UK, data on economic activity rate are used as indicators of labour market participation.

¹⁸⁷ Hourly wage for Denmark given in Danish Kroner; for the UK in pounds sterling; for the Netherlands in Euros; and indicating disposable hourly labour income including social transfers.

¹⁸⁸ OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*, forthcoming (hereafter, *OSI, At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*).

¹⁸⁹ See the website of the Amsterdam Department for Research and Statistics at <http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/tabel/8690/> (accessed November 2009).

5.2 Unemployment Rates

Unemployment rates run at twice the national average for second-generation Moroccan and Algerian immigrants in France¹⁹⁰ and for Turkish nationals in Germany.¹⁹¹ In the Netherlands the unemployment rate among Moroccans and Turks is between two and a half and three times the national average.¹⁹² In Belgium, the unemployment rate among Moroccans and Turks, at 38 per cent, is five times the level of the national unemployment rate of 7 per cent.¹⁹³

While unemployment rates remain higher for some Muslim groups compared with the majority population, since the mid-1990s economic growth has in some countries led to a sharper fall in unemployment rates for minorities compared with the majority population. Between 1997 and 2007 the unemployment rate in the Netherlands for non-western immigrants went down from 20 per cent to 10 per cent, while the unemployment rate for native Dutch was 4 per cent.¹⁹⁴ In Belgium there was particular success at reducing the number of Moroccans and Turks facing long-term unemployment. As a proportion of those who were unemployed, long-term unemployment fell from 61 per cent in 2003 to 46 per cent in 2007. However, this

¹⁹⁰ Data from the 1999 Census shows that unemployed among young people whose parents are born in Algeria or Morocco is 40% compared to a national youth unemployment rate of 20% INSEE, *Les immigrés en France* (Immigrants in France), édition 2005, p. 130, cited in S. Tebbakh, 2007, p. 42 note 101). A survey of those French school leavers in 1998 found that after five years unemployment rate among the North Africans in the cohort was double that of young people whose parents were born in France, CEREQ Survey "Generation 98"; R. Silberman and I. Fournier, "Jeunes issus de l'immigration: une pénalité à l'embauche qui perdure..." (Young people descended from the immigrant population: penalisation in the recruitment process that lasts...), Bref, n° 226, janvier 2006, p. 3.

¹⁹¹ Jochen Blaschke, "Tolerated but Marginalised – Muslims in Germany", Edition Parabolis Verlagsabteilung im Europäischen Migrationszentrum (EMZ) (eds.), *State Policies towards Muslim Minorities. Sweden, Great Britain and Germany*, Kempten, 2004, p. 123.

¹⁹² In the Netherlands the unemployment rate among Moroccans is 29% and for Turks it is 21%, this compares to a national unemployment rate of 9% in SCP, Hoge (jeugd)werkloosheid onder etnische minderheden. Nieuwe bevindingen uit het LAS-onderzoek (High Youth Unemployment among Ethnic Minorities. New Findings from the LAS Study), Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, The Hague, 2006 (in Dutch) cited in Demant et al. *Muslims in the EU, City Reports – The Netherlands: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review*, Budapest, Open Society Institute, 2007.

¹⁹³ Okkerse, L. and Termote, A., Etudes statistiques no. 111: Singularité des étrangers sur la marché de l'emploi (Singularity of Foreign Workers in the Labour Market), Brussels: Institut National de la Statistique, 2004.

¹⁹⁴ CBS, *Jaarrapport integratie 2008* (Annual Integration Report 2008), The Hague, 2008, p. 61. (hereafter CBS, *Jaarrapport integratie 2008*) cited in OSI, *At Home In Europe: Muslims in Rotterdam*, forthcoming (hereafter, OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Rotterdam*).

figure is still high when compared with the majority population, where 35 per cent of those unemployed faced long-term unemployment.¹⁹⁵

There are, however, indications that minorities are more vulnerable to unemployment during the economic downturn, due to their position in the labour market. In the Netherlands, non-western migrants are twice as likely to be found with “flexible contracts”, contracts with no guaranteed hours of work, than native Dutch.¹⁹⁶ In Belgium, between January 2008 and 2009, the unemployment rate for Moroccans and Turks increased more than that of the labour force as a whole, by 20 percent compared with 8 percent.¹⁹⁷

5.3 Poverty

Data also show that hourly pay rates for Muslim groups is lower than that of the majority population. One consequence of low pay is that even among those in employment, poverty rates are high. In Belgium, the proportion of the population living below the poverty line is 10 per cent for native Belgians, but for Turks it is 59 per cent and for Moroccans 56 per cent.¹⁹⁸ In Amsterdam, 32 per cent of Turkish households and 37 per cent of Moroccan households in 2006 lived on the minimum income compared with 13 per cent of Dutch households.¹⁹⁹ In the UK, data from the 2002/03 to 2004/05 Family Resources Survey showed poverty as particularly high among Pakistani (67 per cent) and Bangladeshi (55 per cent) households.²⁰⁰

The family’s work status is central in household poverty. In the UK, a significant part of the poverty experienced by Pakistani and Bangladeshi households is due to the large number of families with no adults in paid employment. A third of Bangladeshi households and a quarter of Pakistani households have no adults in work. However, the gap in the poverty rates between ethnic-minority groups and the general population is greater when comparing households with adults in paid employment

¹⁹⁵ VDA, *Allochtonen sneller aan het werk (Migrants faster at work)*, VDAB Studiedienst, 2008. cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

¹⁹⁶ OSI, *At Home In Europe: Muslims in Rotterdam*.

¹⁹⁷ OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

¹⁹⁸ Van Robaey, B. & Perrin, N., *Armoede bij personen van vreemde herkomst becijferd – Deelverslag van ‘Armoede bij personen van vreemde herkomst’*, (Poverty among persons of foreign origin quantified), UA-OASeS, Antwerp, 2006, available at http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedFiles/KBS-FRB/Files/NL/PUB_1635_Armoede_vreemde_origine_becijferd.pdf (accessed November 2009) cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

¹⁹⁹ See the Amsterdam Department for Research and Statistics at <http://os.amsterdam.nl/tabel/9324> (accessed November 2009), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*, forthcoming (hereafter, OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*).

²⁰⁰ P. Kenway and G. Palmer *Poverty among ethnic groups how and why does it differ?* York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation/New Policy Institute, 2007 (hereafter, Kenway & Palmer, *Poverty among ethnic groups*).

(that is “working households”) than those with no adults in work (“workless households”). Among those in working families, around 60 per cent of Bangladeshi and 40 per cent of Pakistani households are in poverty compared with 10–15 per cent for white British households. Differences in pay rates are the major factor in the difference in income poverty rates once demography and family work status is taken into account.²⁰¹

5.4 Explaining Labour-market Disadvantage: Human Capital

A range of explanations are cited to account for the differences in labour-market participation of different groups.²⁰² Much of the labour-market disadvantage experienced by minority groups is attributed to differences in social capital, in particular levels of education and skills. Many Muslims in Europe arrived as guestworkers to do unskilled or low-skilled jobs. The Hamburg Integration Plan attributes the poor labour-market position of migrants to structural changes in the labour market itself and the decrease in the number of unskilled or low-skilled jobs.²⁰³ Data from Slotervaart in Amsterdam show that unemployment correlates strongly with low education levels. In 2007, of the 1,789 unemployed job seekers in the submunicipality, 1,181 had no basic qualifications.²⁰⁴ By contrast, the employment rate of highly educated Turks and Moroccans (80 per cent) is close to that of their Dutch peers (85 per cent).²⁰⁵

The OSI sample confirms the general link between education and employment.

²⁰¹ Kenway & Palmer, *Poverty among ethnic groups*.

²⁰² The Institute for Labour Studies in its report for the European Commission’s The High Level Advisory Group of Experts on the Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities, identified fourteen key barriers. See Zimmerman *et al.*, *Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities*.

²⁰³ Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg Behörde für Soziales, Familie, Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz, *Hamburger Handlungskonzept zur Integration von Zuwanderern* (Hamburg Action Plan on Integration), p. 23, available at <http://www.hamburg.de/contentblob/128792/data/konzept.pdf> (accessed November 2009, hereafter, Hamburg Action Plan on Integration).

²⁰⁴ OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*.

²⁰⁵ CBS *Jaarrapport integratie 2008*, p. 3.

**Table 64. Current or past employment type
(breakdown by highest level of education completed) (I17)**

	No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
Economically inactive	39.1%	18.7%	14.0%	5.7%	13.3%
Modern professional occupations	1.6%	3.6%	12.9%	39.3%	19.7%
Clerical and intermediate occupations	2.3%	6.3%	19.1%	14.3%	15.1%
Senior managers or administrators	0.8%	0.4%	1.4%	7.7%	3.3%
Technical and craft occupations	13.3%	6.7%	10.4%	2.7%	7.7%
Semi-routine manual and service occupations	12.5%	16.7%	15.6%	8.1%	13.2%
Routine manual and service occupations	27.3%	41.7%	19.9%	6.4%	18.5%
Middle or junior managers	1.6%	5.6%	5.1%	5.5%	5.1%
Traditional professional occupations	1.6%	0.4%	1.4%	10.4%	4.2%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	128	252	1112	705
		2197			

Source: Open Society Institute data

For example, the majority of respondents employed in modern and traditional professional occupations or who are senior managers are university graduates, while respondents without any formal education tend to be concentrated in routine manual occupations or else are unemployed. The lower the level of qualifications the person possesses, the more likely it is that he or she will be unemployed: respondents with no formal education are 2.1 times more likely to be unemployed as those with primary education, 2.8 times as those with secondary education and 6.9 times more likely as those with a university degree. In terms of percentages, 39.1 per cent of those without any formal education are unemployed, compared with 5.7 per cent of university graduates.

However, separating the responses into religious categories shows a discrepancy between Muslims' and non-Muslims' occupations, whereby Muslims are disproportionately unemployed or over-represented in lower-skilled jobs.²⁰⁶

Referring to OSI data, the following should be considered.

- Muslims are almost three times more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims; 19.8 per cent of Muslims are unemployed, compared with 6.8 per cent of non-Muslims.
- Just under 0.1 per cent of Muslim university graduates are unemployed, compared with just 3.1 per cent of non-Muslims.
- 64.8 per cent of Muslim university graduates are employed in higher skilled positions, compared with 85.3 per cent of non-Muslim university graduates. Proportionally, non-Muslim university graduates are 1.6 times more likely than Muslim university graduates to be employed in modern professional occupations. However, Muslim and non-Muslim graduates also tend to be more equally distributed within traditional professional and clerical occupations, or as senior or middle managers.
- 55.5 per cent of Muslim men are concentrated in low-skill/low-wage jobs and 25.1 per cent alone are employed in routine manual and service occupations.
- Non-Muslim men are 2.3 times more likely than Muslim men to be employed in modern professional occupations (22.4 per cent non-Muslim, compared with 9.9 per cent Muslim).
- Of the 72.1 per cent of Muslim women who are/were employed, significant proportions are concentrated in clerical and intermediate occupations (21.4 per cent), routine manual or service occupations (17.8 per cent), modern professional occupations (15 per cent) and semi-routine occupations (12 per cent). Only 1.8 per cent are middle managers and 1.3 per cent are senior managers.
- Muslims born in a EU state are just as likely to be unemployed as Muslims born outside a EU state, but EU-born non-Muslims are slightly more likely to be employed than non-Muslims born elsewhere.

5.5 Social Networks and Social Capital

Fournier and Silberman suggest that the greater risk of unemployment in France among the second-generation children of non-EU migrants cannot be accounted for by their educational levels. They say that part of the explanation lies in the lower social

²⁰⁶ See Table 65. and Table 66. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

capital and access to employment in the networks of the children's parents.²⁰⁷ The impact of the social network on the employment opportunities of migrants has been examined in greater detail in the United States than in Europe.²⁰⁸ The Swedish integration report, for example, notes the importance of social networks to recruitment into employment,²⁰⁹ which, particularly in small and medium-sized firms, is often based on existing networks of employers and employees. Where the workforce is predominantly of the majority population, such practices constitute a form of indirect discrimination. The ethno-stratification of the labour market, with migrants concentrated in particular sectors, limits the networks they are able to build beyond their ethnic group.

For Turks in Germany, the composition of their friendship networks may account for a significant part of the ethnic penalty they face in the labour market.²¹⁰ Research with Somalis in Copenhagen finds that those with personal relationships with Danes were more likely to take a proactive approach to looking for jobs, because these friendships provided them with the encouragement and advice needed to overcome the fears of discrimination that demotivated others.²¹¹

Networks are important in translating improved education achievement into improved labour-market attainment. Analysis of data on the social mobility of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suggests that they do not attain the level of social mobility in terms of employment that would be expected in light of their improved educational achievements, and that once educational levels are taken into consideration, their social class mobility is substantially worse than a white non-migrant peer in the same cohort.

²⁰⁷ R. Silberman and I. Fournier, "Immigrants' Children and the Labour Market. The Mechanisms of Selective Discrimination. From one generation to another. How do the immigrants and their children see their position on the labour market?", Fourth International MigCities Conference, Lisbon, November 1999.

²⁰⁸ See Elliot and M. Sims, "Ghettos and Barrios: The Impact of Neighborhood Poverty and Race on Job Matching among Blacks and Latinos", *Social Problems* 48(3), 2001, pp. 341–361; R. M. Fernandez and E. J. Castilla "How Much Is that Social Network Worth?", *Social Capital in Employee Referral Networks. Social Capital: Theory and Research*, N. Lin, K. Cook, and R. S. B. Hawthorne (eds.) New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 2001, pp. 85–104; J. Sanders, V. Nee, and S. Sernau "Asian Immigrants' Reliance on Social Ties in a Multiethnic Labor Market", *Social Forces* 81(1) 2001, pp. 281–314.

²⁰⁹ *Rapport Integration 2005* Integrationsverket (Swedish Integration Board), Norrköping, 2006, cited in Roger Andersson, "Ethnic Residential Segregation and Integration Processes in Sweden", Karen Schonwalder (eds.) *Residential Segregation and the integration of immigrants Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden*, Social Science Research Centre Berlin, Berlin, 2007, p. 63.

²¹⁰ F. Kalter, "Auf der Suche nach einer Erklärung für die spezifischen Arbeitsmarktnachteile von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft: Zugleich eine Replik auf den Beitrag von Holger Seibert und Heike Solga", *Z. Soziol.* 354, 2006, pp. 144–60 (in German).

²¹¹ C.B. Jagd, "Breaking the Pattern of Unemployment through Social Networks", paper presented at the 13th Nordic Migration Conference, 18–20 November 2004, available at <http://www.amid.dk/ocs/viewpaper.php?id=93&cf=1> (accessed November 2009).

It is suggested that this in part reflects the differential class impact of ethnic-bonding social capital on social mobility. In other words, for groups such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis concentrated in lower-class positions, the beneficial effects of strong ethnic-bonding social capital in creating high aspirations and a drive for education is countered by the lack of bridging social capital (networks beyond their immediate community) that is needed to turn these aspirations into reality. The research finds that Pakistanis from working-class origins “are less likely than their white non-migrant counterparts to end up in professional or managerial positions”.²¹² Platt finds that “relatively small proportions with no qualifications from the Pakistani, Indian and Caribbean groups end up in the professional or managerial classes compared to the white groups”. From this she argues that “the ethnic penalty [...] seems greater for the least advantaged; and to the extent that any minority group is concentrated among those with no qualifications, they will then suffer disproportionately”.²¹³

Translating educational aspiration and achievement into labour-market participation also requires knowledge of the formal and informal rules that operate in the labour market. Responses from OSI focus group participants and questionnaires suggest there is a need for better careers information and advice. The range of jobs that young people see as potential is limited. A focus group participant who also worked with young people in trying to get them into employment comments on the lack of knowledge about the labour market: “In Germany we have 455 official professions, but the girls here focus on only five, most commonly medical secretary, sales, and hairdressing. For boys it is equally fixed.” Nadia Nagie, an expert who works for the Berlin NGO KUMULUS, also argues that there is a lack of knowledge among parents, students and teachers about the complex educational and vocational training system in Germany. Their organisation was trying to explain, for example, that a good vocational qualification like a craft certificate was considered more highly in its profession than a bad or average high-school education certificate.

5.6 Language Fluency

Poor fluency in the national or majority language is often a barrier for first-generation migrants.²¹⁴ Many were recruited to undertake unskilled employment in an ethnically segmented labour market that did not require them to pick up the majority language or other skills that enhanced employment opportunities. Lack of confidence in the majority language limits the ability of individuals to retrain and upskill, limiting their

²¹² L. Platt, “Making education count: the effects of ethnicity and qualifications on intergenerational social class mobility”, *The Sociological Review* Vol. 55, No. 3, 2007, pp. 485–508, at 498 (hereafter, Platt, “Making education count”).

²¹³ Platt, “Making education count”, p. 498.

²¹⁴ H. Esser, “Migration, Language and Integration” *AKI Res. Rev.* 4. Berlin, Wiss. Berlin Sozial (WZB), 2006, available at http://www.wzb.eu/ZKD/AKI/files/aki_research_review_4.pdf (accessed November 2009).

employment opportunities to ethnic employment markets.²¹⁵ Research in the UK has found a positive association between English-language fluency among immigrants and pay.²¹⁶ Improving written skills has a far greater impact on the availability of employment than improved verbal skills. The latter appears to increase employment probabilities by five per cent, while the former improves it by 13 per cent.²¹⁷

5.7 Ethnic Penalty

Language competence and lack of recognition of qualifications is less of an issue for Muslims born and educated in Europe. While their lower education attainment rates shape their labour-market participation, it does not seem to fully account for their position in the labour market.

Labour-market research in the United States has for some time identified an “ethnic penalty” experienced by some minority groups in the labour market. A penalty is said to exist where statistical analysis of data shows differences persist between ethnic groups after common socio-economic variables that are expected affect labour-market participation, such as education and age, have been taken into account.

The limitations in data collection make similar analysis in Europe more challenging. In France, the CEREQ (French Centre for Research on Education, Training and Employment) survey tracks over time cohorts of students from a particular year to follow their integration into the labour market. Analysis of CEREQ data for the class of 1998 shows that when comparing those with the same level of qualifications, labour-market participation rates are lower for young people with foreign-born parents compared with those with French-born parents.²¹⁸ Comparing those with the same level of education also shows that, three years after leaving education, students of North African backgrounds were less likely than their peers to be managers but more likely to be employees or working as lower-level professionals.²¹⁹ Research

²¹⁵ P. Schellekens, *English Language as a Barrier to Employment, Education and Training*, Department for Education and Skills, London, 2001.

²¹⁶ M. A. Shields, and S. Wheatley Price, “The English language fluency and occupational success of ethnic minority immigrant men living in English metropolitan areas” *Journal of Population Economics* Vol. 15, 2002, pp. 137–160.

²¹⁷ C. Dustmann, and F. Fabbri, “Language Proficiency and Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK”, *The Economic Journal* Vol. 113, 2003, pp. 695–717.

²¹⁸ Alain Frickey and Jean-Luc Primon, *Jeunes diplômés issus de l’immigration: insertion professionnelle ou discriminations?* (Young graduates of immigrant descent: occupational integration or discrimination?), La Documentation française, collection Etudes et Recherches, Paris, 2005 (hereafter, Frickey & Primon, *Jeunes diplômés issus de l’immigration: insertion professionnelle ou discriminations?*), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Marseille*, forthcoming (hereafter, OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Marseille*).

²¹⁹ Frickey & Primon, *Jeunes diplômés issus de l’immigration: insertion professionnelle ou discriminations?*

commissioned by the Dutch government found that four per cent of the unemployment experienced by Moroccans and Turks cannot be explained by personal factors relevant to the labour market.²²⁰ Data presented by Heath *et al.* show that even after the difference in education is taken into account, the second-generation groups are significantly more likely than the majority population to face unemployment and less likely to access the salariat. They conclude that for the second generation, after differences in education are accounted for, ethnic penalties appear to remain and that “the most disadvantaged groups are the second generation of Turkish ancestry in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands; of Moroccan or North African ancestry in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands; of Caribbean or Pakistani ancestry in Britain; and of Surinamese ancestry in the Netherlands”.²²¹

5.8 Religion Penalty

In addition, there is the religion penalty. Determining whether Muslims experience this in employment situations is more difficult. The inclusion of questions on religious affiliation in census and labour-market data allows analysts in the UK to examine this issue. Clarke and Drinkwater find “some evidence that, controlling for other factors, Muslims have lower employment rates than individuals with another, or indeed no, religion”. However, they argue that the close correlation between religion and ethnicity for some ethnic groups makes it difficult to separate the influences of ethnicity and religion. Furthermore, “it may be tradition, rather than religious belief *per se*, that influences attitudes to female labour force participation and childcare”. They argue that it could be “misleading to label behaviour, such as presumably voluntary adherence to a particular religion, as a cause of economic disadvantage”.²²² Berthoud and Blekesaune suggest that “religion rather than ethnicity is the characteristic associated with employment disadvantage”.²²³ A cross-referencing of ethnicity and religion shows that “when investigating religious groups within different ethnic groups, we find that all Muslim groups are in a disadvantageous employment position irrespective of which ethnic group they belong to”.²²⁴ Thus, the employment penalty faced by Indian Muslims was greater than that of Indian Hindus, Sikhs and Christians.

²²⁰ K. Andriessen, *Discriminatiemonitor niet-westerse allochtonen op de arbeidsmarkt*. (Discrimination monitor non-Western immigrants on the labour market), SCP, The Hague, 2007 (in Dutch), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Rotterdam*.

²²¹ Anthony Heath, Catherine Rethon, and Elina Kilpi, “The Second Generation in Western Europe: Education, Unemployment, and Occupational Attainment”, *Annual Review of Sociology* 34, 2008, pp. 211–235 at 218 (hereafter, Heath *et al.*, “The Second Generation in Western Europe”).

²²² K. Clarke, and S. Drinkwater, *Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market: Dynamics and Diversity* Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 2007, p. 48.

²²³ R. Berthoud and M. Blekesaune, *Persistent employment disadvantage*, DWP Research Report No. 416, Norwich, Department for Work and Pensions, 2007, p. 72 (hereafter, Berthoud & Blekesaune, *Persistent employment disadvantage*).

²²⁴ Berthoud and Blekesaune, *Persistent employment disadvantage*, p. 76.

When comparing minority groups, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims experience a greater employment penalty than Caribbean or black African Christians.

5.9 Discrimination

The work on ethnic and religion penalties seeks, in part, to identify the role of discrimination in shaping the labour-market participation of minority groups. While statistical analysis can be used to identify the existence of an ethnic or religion penalty, it does not identify the extent to which that penalty is the result of discrimination. As Heath and Cheun stress, “ethnic penalties must not be equated with discrimination *per se*, although discrimination is likely to be one major component of the ethnic penalties”.²²⁵ Expectations and experiences of discrimination shape the employment choices made by those from ethnic-minority groups. Individuals avoid employment in industries where the environment is perceived to be hostile to them.²²⁶

Evidence of discrimination in employment is more difficult to obtain. The clearest examples of discrimination come from cases brought against employers by individuals. In addition to this, so-called situation testing, which is making applications for jobs, citing the same qualifications, but with names that suggest different ethnic or religious backgrounds, can provide evidence of discrimination in recruitment practices. Tests carried out in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands found significant rates of discrimination against migrants and ethnic-minority applicants in all three countries.²²⁷ Situation testing in France found that a person from the Maghreb had five times less chance of receiving a positive reply than other applicants.²²⁸ In Denmark, it was found that chances of an applicant being called for a job interview varied by a ratio of 1:32 depending on whether the applicant used a typically Danish name or one suggesting a Turkish, Arab or Pakistani background.²²⁹ A Muslim

²²⁵ A. Heath and S. Y. Cheung, “Ethnic penalties in the labour market: employers and discrimination”, Research Report No. 341, Department for Work and Pensions, London, 2006, p. 5.

²²⁶ See J. Wrench, and T. Qureshi, *Higher Horizons: A qualitative study of young men of Bangladeshi origin*, Research Studies RS30, Department for Education and Employment, London, 1996; J. Aston, H. Hooker, R. Page, and R. Wilson, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes to work and family*, DWP Research Report 458, Department for Work and Pensions, London, 2007 (hereafter Aston *et al.*, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes*); Iris Andriessen, Jaco Dagevos, Eline Nievers and Igor Boog, *discriminatiemonitor niet westerse alloctonen op de arbeidsmarkt* (Discrimination Monitor non-Western immigrants in the labour market), SCP, The Hague, 2007 (in Dutch).

²²⁷ R. Zegers de Beijl, (ed.), *Documenting discrimination against migrant workers in the labour market. A comparative study of four European countries*, ILO, Geneva, 2000.

²²⁸ EUMC, *Muslims in the EU*, pp. 44–45.

²²⁹ J. Hjarnø and T. Bager, *Diskriminering af unge med indvandrerbaggrund ved jobsøgning* (Discrimination of young applicants with immigrant backgrounds during job applications), Research Paper No. 21, DAMES. Esbjerg, 1997, cited in M. Hussain, *Muslims in EU Cities Report: Denmark Preliminary Research and Literature Review*, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2007 (hereafter, Hussain, *Muslims in the EU Literature Review: Denmark*).

respondent in Leicester recalled securing interviews for jobs when he applied using the name David, where previously he had failed when applying for the same positions with his real name.

Levels of labour-market discrimination may also be gauged from self-reporting surveys, that is, surveys in which people are asked if they think they have faced discrimination. The accuracy of such surveys is difficult to ascertain as individuals may either under- or overestimate instances of discrimination. Research on discrimination in Antwerp has found that when looking for a job, one in ten Moroccan and Turkish people experience discrimination frequently, while a further 33 per cent of Moroccan male and 20 per cent of Turkish male and female employees and Moroccan female employees report experiencing discrimination sometimes.²³⁰ Analysis of the CEREQ generation 1998 data finds that 17 per cent of North Africans felt that they faced discrimination in employment because of their ethnic or religious origins. A far greater proportion (70 per cent) cited discrimination on the basis of their name.²³¹ The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) EU Minorities and Discrimination Survey found that in Germany, 28 per cent of Turks reported encountering discrimination when looking for work, and 23 per cent encountered discrimination at work.²³² In the British Home Office Citizenship Survey 24 per cent of Bangladeshis and 12 per cent of Pakistanis cited racial discrimination as a reason for being refused a job. Religious discrimination was cited by 13 per cent of Bangladeshis and 9 per cent of Pakistanis.²³³ In the Eurobarometer Survey 26 per cent of respondents believed that an expression of a religious belief would put a job applicant at a disadvantage.²³⁴ The results varied across different EU states, with the visible expression of religious identity cited as most likely to disadvantage a job applicant in Denmark (65 per cent) and the Netherlands

²³⁰ V. Vandezande, F. Fleischmann, G. Baysu, M. Swyngedouw, and K. Phalet, *De Turkse en Marokkaanse tweede generatie op de arbeidsmarkt in Antwerpen en Brussel* (Turkish and Moroccan second generation on the labour market in Antwerp and Brussels), Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek, Leuven, 2008, cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

²³¹ A. Frickey, and J.-L. Primon, “Jeunes issus de l’immigration: les diplômés de l’enseignement supérieur ne garantissent pas un égal accès à l’emploi” (“Young People with an Immigrant Background: the Diplomas of Higher Education Do Not Guarantee Equal Access to Employment”), *Formation Emploi*, n°29, 2002 (in French).

²³² FRA, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*, p. 6.

²³³ H. Green, H. Connolly and C. Farmer, *2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey: People, Families and Communities*, Home Office Research Study 289, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, London, 2004.

²³⁴ The question asked was: In (OUR COUNTRY), when a company wants to hire someone and has the choice between two candidates with equal skills and qualifications, which of the following criteria may, in your opinion, put one candidate at a disadvantage? The expression of a religious belief (for example wearing a visible religious symbol), see Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p. 26.

(59 per cent) and was least problematic in the UK (21 per cent).²³⁵ Further analysis found that over a third of respondents who were managers (35 per cent) said that a person would experience difficulty in a job interview because of the expression of a religious belief.²³⁶

In the OSI survey 30 per cent of Muslim respondents and 27 per cent of non-Muslim respondents said that they had been turned down for a job in the previous five years.²³⁷

When religion, gender and place of birth are correlated, Muslim women born in the EU are the group most likely to have been refused a job in the past five years (37.3 per cent), while non-Muslim women born outside a EU state are second most likely (34.2 per cent).²³⁸

Muslim men born in the EU also indicate a high rate of refusal (33.7 per cent). Muslim women born outside the EU and non-Muslim women born within the EU are the two groups least likely to have been refused a job in the past five years (25.1 per cent each). Muslim respondents who show visible signs of their religious identity have experienced a fractionally higher rate of refusal than visibly religious non-Muslims (26 per cent and 24.4 per cent, respectively).

²³⁵ There were also results for Germany 43%; Belgium 46%; France 36%; and Sweden 51%. See Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, table QA7.

²³⁶ Eurobarometer *Discrimination in the EU*, p. 27.

²³⁷ See Table 67. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

²³⁸ See Table 68. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

**Table 69. Have you been refused a job in this country in the last 5 years?
(breakdown by religion and visible signs of religious identity) (H10)**

		Visible signs of their religious identity		
		Yes	No	Total
Muslim	Yes	26.0%	32.2%	29.9%
	No	39.5%	48.3%	45.0%
	Don't know	1.0%	2.6%	2.0%
	Not applicable	33.6%	16.9%	23.1%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	408	698	1106
Non-Muslim	Yes	24.4%	27.1%	27.0%
	No	46.7%	51.1%	50.9%
	Don't know	2.2%	1.0%	1.0%
	Not applicable	26.7%	20.8%	21.0%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	45	1039	1084

Source: Open Society Institute data

This difference is more marked between Muslims and non-Muslims who do not show any signs of their religiosity.

**Table 70. Have you been refused a job in this country in the last 5 years?
(breakdown by highest level of education completed) (H10)**

		Highest level of education completed				Total
		No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	
Yes		7.1%	18.7%	27.2%	37.6%	28.4%
No		48.0%	50.6%	47.9%	47.3%	48.0%
Don't know		4.7%	1.2%	1.3%	1.4%	1.5%
Not applicable		40.2%	29.5%	23.5%	13.6%	22.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	127	251	1112	704	2194

Source: Open Society Institute data

Respondents with higher qualifications tend to experience greater rates of refusal, and Table 70. shows that 37.6 per cent of university graduates had been refused a job in the past five years compared with 7.1 per cent of those with no formal qualifications. At the same time, a far greater proportion of respondents with few or no qualifications answered “Not applicable” to this question, suggesting that they had not applied for a job in the first place. Respondents who obtained their qualifications in another EU country experienced the highest rates of refusal (32.9 per cent), whilst those who had studied in a non-EU state experienced the lowest levels (25.8 per cent).

**Table 71. Have you been refused a job in this country in the last 5 years?
(breakdown by location of education) (H10)**

		Where did interviewee study?			
		In this country	In another EU state	In a non-EU state	Total
Yes		30.9%	32.9%	25.8%	29.7%
No		48.7%	44.3%	47.0%	48.1%
Don't know		1.4%	–	1.3%	1.3%
Not applicable		19.0%	22.8%	25.8%	20.9%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1448	79	523	2050

Source: Open Society Institute data

Muslim and non-Muslim respondents differ in how they interpret the reasons for being turned down for a job. In general, Muslim respondents identify discrimination based on ethnicity (15 per cent) slightly more frequently than religious discrimination (12 per cent) as the reason.

Table 72. For what reasons were you refused a job? (H11)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Your gender	0.3%	0.6%	40.0%
Your age	2.3%	4.5%	3.4%
Your ethnicity	4.5%	0.8%	2.7%
Your religion	3.8%	–	1.9%
Your colour	1.9%	1.4%	1.6%
Where you live	0.8%	0.3%	0.5%
Other	12.8%	14.3%	13.6%
Don't know	3.3%	4.5%	3.9%
N/A	70.4%	73.6%	72.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1089

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, among Muslim respondents, Muslim women born in Europe identified religion (21 per cent) as the basis of discrimination more frequently than ethnicity (12 per cent).²³⁹

In interpreting these findings it must be remembered that the nature of the discrimination Muslims encounter, the boundaries between different characteristics, race, ethnicity, religion and gender, are less precise and stable than it might first appear.²⁴⁰ Identifying the grounds of discrimination or even the primary grounds may not be possible where a person has more than one characteristic that makes them a target of discrimination. Furthermore, individuals interpret their experiences in ways

²³⁹ See Table 73. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

²⁴⁰ For a discussion of the racialisation of religion see M. Chon and D. Artz, "Walking While Muslim", *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68, 2005, at p. 228 where they note that "Religion is not 'immutable' in the way we understand skin colour to be. Religious affiliation or identity is always a matter of choice. Yet, especially through the war on terror, Islam is acquiring characteristics of immutability, innateness, inevitability, inheritability and, importantly inferiority. In other words religious differences are being 'racialised'".

that allow them to mediate and cope with their experiences.²⁴¹ Muslims face different forms of discrimination and experience differing disadvantages, depending on a wide range of characteristics, including perceptions of race, ethnicity and gender. This is illustrated by a respondent from Marseille, a graduate of Marseille Business School, who was unable to find employment 2.5 years after graduating:

I have had real difficult situations. I've had phone interviews with firms, it went rather well. When I arrived at the office, the face changed. My name is Moussa Saïd, Arab name and first problem. I arrive: I am black. Second problem. "On top of that he is Muslim. And he lives in a rough area. We can't cope any more." I have faced so much difficulty in securing a job that I promise that when a does firm take me, I'll finish at the top. I have had so much trouble that if I must, I will work 65 hours instead of 35 to prove myself to my colleagues, I'll do it!

One area where discrimination on the grounds of religion and gender intersect is in relation to exclusion from the labour market of women who wear the *hijab*. In Germany, the law of state neutrality has been used to exclude Muslim women who wear the headscarf from certain jobs. Although the ban is limited to specific public positions, the interviews with stakeholders and discussion in focus groups indicated that the ban has affected the attitudes of private-sector employers towards women who wear the *hijab*. In the experience of a focus group participant who worked with young people in careers counselling in Berlin, young women who wore headscarves could not secure apprenticeships or internships. Another recalled that during her internship at a local police station she was only given administrative work, whereas her fellow intern who did not wear a *hijab* was allowed to fully participate in all areas of work, including accompanying officers on patrol. The anti-discrimination regional office in Berlin has called for a review of the *Neutralitätsgesetz* in light of implementation of EU Directives on discrimination.

In the Netherlands, 10 per cent of discrimination cases handled by the anti-discrimination bureau relate to the *hijab*. In Antwerp, the municipal authorities introduced a regulation that prevented women wearing the *hijab* in positions that involved direct contact with the public. It was the perception of focus group

²⁴¹ M. Bying, "Mediating Discrimination: Resisting Oppression Among African-American Muslim Women", *Social Problems* 45(4), 1998, at pp. 474–475, "mediation means having the agency to respond to discrimination in ways that resist its power and oppression...human agency is central to mediation: ownership, accountability, self definition, self-determination, and self-evaluation mean that in the face of painful discrimination people maintain their humanity and recognise the humanity of others". Bying finds that the African-American Muslim women she interviewed "were able to resist the oppression of discrimination by a humanist vision that views discrimination as triggered by difference. Even though these women experience classic cases of discrimination, they maintain the ability of self-definition, determination, and valuation. They define the importance of the experience for themselves and their lives, and thereby are able to mediate discrimination... [They] use their membership in the Muslim community as a self defining and safe social space."

participants that the exclusion of women wearing the headscarf has now become normalised in the mainstream labour market. The dilemma women who choose to wear the headscarf are confronted with, of whether to accept their exclusion from mainstream employment or to remove their headscarf, was raised by a focus group participant in Marseille who was urged by her employer to take off her scarf because of comments from the business's clients: "So either we give up, we think that it is not of utmost importance to dress like that, and [give] priority to earning a living and being independent. Or we think, this is to defend freedom, it is a right that has been infringed, they have infringed on my right to dress [how] I like."

Women in focus groups were keenly aware of having to overcome and challenge stereotypes held about Muslim women, in order to show that these stereotypes do not apply to them. In Amsterdam, while women felt it was difficult to reach the positions they wanted to because of their headscarves and cultural differences, they saw themselves as the bridging generation; they expected things to improve over time, so that the third generation would not encounter the same obstacles.

5.10 Muslim Women and Employment

While the ban on the *hijab* is an important issue for many Muslim women who are pursuing employment and integration through participation in the mainstream labour market, a further issue of concern for policymakers is raising the overall level of economic participation of Muslim women. As noted earlier, economic participation rates for some female Muslim groups is below 40 per cent.

Discussions in the focus groups suggested that cultural expectations around child care and other caring responsibilities play a significant part in shaping the choices Muslim women make about labour-market participation. Women were more likely to look for employment in the local area where they lived so that they could reconcile work and family responsibilities. Women did refer to the advantage of employment as well as financial benefits and they talked about paid employment as providing them with "something that is their own", but they wanted to ensure that it left time for looking after their children. Muslim women who were in employment took pride in being equal in exchanges and discussion with employers and colleagues, a position that differed significantly from their mothers'. Women in the labour market, referring to the possibility that they might stay at home once their partners were earning enough, viewed their decision as no different from that made by non-Muslim professional working women.

These findings are consistent with research in the UK which shows that among Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, for example, there is a strong emphasis on the importance of

parenting.²⁴² The preference to stay at home with their children combines with having more children to keep women out of the labour market for longer. Having children at a younger age may also mean that women have limited or no labour-market experience prior to becoming parents; this further reduces the likelihood of a woman returning to the labour market after becoming a mother.²⁴³ For those in work, the need for work to fit around family responsibilities also leads to underemployment: “Women with first or postgraduate degrees had chosen to work in jobs that they were perhaps over-qualified for, in order to be able to work part-time, gain flexibility, and balance the demands of their family with their work.”²⁴⁴ The strong cultural expectation of marriage and motherhood reinforces the general correlation between educational qualifications and participation in the labour market. In particular, women without qualifications are more likely to be economically inactive, married and to have had more children at a younger age.²⁴⁵

5.11 Action to Support Labour-market Participation

Across the 11 cities, a range of different measures are being taken to support labour-market participation. Given the position Muslims occupy in the labour market, initiatives aimed at the most disadvantaged should have a disproportionate impact on them. This includes initiatives aimed at improving the opportunities of those leaving education to make the transition to the labour market. In Amsterdam there is networking between local schools and businesses in order to improve opportunities for obtaining apprenticeships. The sports company Nike is, for example, involved in a marketing project with students from the Calvijn Met Junior College. In Marseille the “Youth Challenge” initiative is an example of an initiative developed to bring young people into closer contact with employers and employers in closer contact with youngsters with no qualifications. A local project, in partnership with the Société Générale Bank developed a training programme aimed at youths without qualifications, which would lead to a level 3 diploma after four years, and potentially a job in sales. Sixty youths were pre-selected, 17 were presented to the Bank and finally 12 were selected.

²⁴² See J. Lindley, A. Dale and S. Dex, “Ethnic differences in women’s demographic and family characteristics and employment profile”, *Labour Market Trends*, April 2004, pp. 153–165; A. Dale, N. Shaheen, V. Kalra, and E. Fieldhouse, “Routes into education and employment for young Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in the UK”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 25, No. 6, 2002, pp. 942–968; A. Dale, N. Shaheen, E. Fieldhouse and V. Kalra, “The labour market prospects for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women”, *Work Employment and Society* Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, pp. 5–25.

²⁴³ Aston *et al.*, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes*.

²⁴⁴ Aston *et al.*, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes*, p. 88.

²⁴⁵ Aston *et al.*, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes*.

Marseille has also developed “Second Chance Schools”. These are schools targeted at young people who originally left school without a diploma. The Second Chance Schools aim to familiarise students with employers through internships. More than 1,700 firms, for the most part small or very small, are partners in this initiative. The schools and employers provide internships, which are implemented in a progressive manner in order to avoid destabilising both students and firms. The instructors evaluate and follow the students each time they do their internships. Direct experience of the working environment is essential to the project. Training is individualised. Each student has a mentor, who supervises 12–15 students. Each youth is considered a trainee, with a salary of €300–600.²⁴⁶ Assessments from the school have been positive. Almost 2,500 youth have been interns of the Second Chance Schools since their beginning. Statistics reveal that of the 1,600 interns who completed their studies between 1998 and 2006, 66 per cent obtained gainful employment.

Refugees and new migrants are frequently identified and targeted as a group with specific needs. In Berlin, job centres have created a post of *Migrationsbeauftragte*, officials with specific responsibility for addressing the labour-market problems faced by migrants.

There are also initiatives that work with Muslim communities and understand the role they have in ensuring advice and information reaches those who are furthest from the labour market. In Berlin, imams, who are important social actors in Muslim communities, to whom parents or young people may look for advice, are trained by the NGO KUMULUS about the educational and employment opportunities available for young people. In Leicester, the employment advice agency Job Centre Plus took employers to local community centres, temples and mosques, so that they could get a better understanding of the barriers faced in recruiting minorities. When a new shopping centre was being developed, the agency put on a “roadshow” to showcase the new employers to the community. In Amsterdam, employers trying to increase applications from women from minorities participate in a jobs fair hosted by the women’s organisation Nisa for Nisa.

Other initiatives, although not working with community institutions or structures, recognise the importance of employing people who reflect and connect to the groups they are trying to reach. In Berlin, Kreuzberg’s “Kietzlotsen” project, which encourages young people to take up employment training opportunities or to return to education, employs outreach workers who share the same background as the young people they are trying to reach. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the Dutch Foundation for Successful Entrepreneurship is piloting a project to support immigrant women to become economically active and to address the problem of child care. In Leicester, the

²⁴⁶ Mission commune d’information sur le fonctionnement des dispositifs de formation professionnelle, Déplacement à Marseille (Joint Mission Information on the operation of vocational training schemes), 2006. See the French Senate website at <http://www.senat.fr> (accessed November 2009).

NGO RASAP received state support to help improve access to employment for migrants, asylum seekers and Muslim women. In explaining the advantages of this targeted approach, a project director at the organisation, explained that they understand the needs of these different groups: “the employment needs are different, there needs to be a faith friendly environment”.

The city authorities themselves are also significant employers, and several have made efforts to encourage applications from minority groups. In Berlin, the Senate ran a campaign “Berlin braucht dich” (Berlin Needs You)²⁴⁷ to encourage people from minority backgrounds to apply for public administration jobs. The campaign included contacting religious leaders, mosques, associations and other immigrant NGOs. Hamburg began a programme to increase the proportion of trainees it employed with a migration background. This included the campaign “Wir sind Hamburg - Bist Du dabei?” (We are Hamburg! Are you with us?),²⁴⁸ aimed at recruiting young people with migration backgrounds.

There are also initiatives directed at particular barriers to participation. Rotterdam, for example, joined the European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, and has a programme aimed at countering discrimination and exclusion, called “Discriminatie? De groeten!” (Discrimination? So Long!).²⁴⁹ It encourages minorities to report discrimination. The Rotterdam initiative also includes programmes to increase skills and qualifications. This includes encouraging vocation streams in schools to place more focus on skills in finding jobs, including application letters and interviews. Employers or small and medium-sized firms are encouraged to increase the diversity of their workforce.

Access to employment for unemployed graduates is another area where initiatives are underway. Recognising that disadvantage in accessing employment can be partly attributed to a lack of networks and knowledge of the labour market, the Young Foundation in London has started a project called *Fastlaners* in an effort to address these barriers.²⁵⁰ The two-week training course for graduates, from ethnic-minority and marginalised background, offers intensive training on CV writing, interviews, job search and strengthening of non-cognitive skills. The objective is to empower graduates, through building skills, to potential work placements and better access to the labour market. It is also linked to supporting the achievement of key local policy targets, including community cohesion as well as employment.

²⁴⁷ See the campaign website at <http://www.berlin-braucht-dich.de>.

²⁴⁸ See the Hamburg city website at <http://www.hamburg.de/bist-du-dabei/62924/bist-du-dabei.html> (accessed November 2009).

²⁴⁹ The text of the programme is available at http://www.vng.nl/Praktijkvoorbeelden/SZI/2007/rotterdamdiscriminatiedegroeten_2007.pdf (in Dutch, accessed November 2009).

²⁵⁰ For more information on this programme, see <http://www.fastlaners.org.uk>.

In general, more non-Muslim respondents (41 per cent) were satisfied with the efforts being made by employers to respect different religious customs than Muslim respondents (37 per cent).

Table 74. Do employers respect different religious customs? (G6)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Too much		1.7%	2.5%	2.1%
About right		36.6%	40.7%	38.6%
Too little		36.0%	23.7%	29.9%
Don't know		25.7%	33.1%	29.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1089	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

In fact, if respondents who said “Don't know” are excluded, then Muslim respondents were evenly split between those who were satisfied with the respect of religious customs shown by employers (49 per cent) and those who felt there was too little respect for different religions and customs (48 per cent). However, further analysis shows that a majority of male respondents (52 per cent) felt employers showed sufficient respect, but a majority of female respondents (52 per cent) felt they showed too little.

Table 75. Do employers respect different religious customs? (breakdown by religion and gender) (G6)

		Muslim male	Muslim female	Non-Muslim male	Non-Muslim female	Total
Too much		2.3%	1.1%	2.7%	2.3%	2.1%
About right		39.4%	33.8%	43.1%	38.4%	38.6%
Too little		34.1%	37.9%	23.4%	24.0%	29.9%
Don't know		24.2%	27.2%	30.8%	35.3%	29.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	558	551	522	567	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

5.12 Key Findings

Muslims are not integrated into the mainstream labour market. They face higher unemployment rates and lower employment rates compared with the general population. Those in employment are often in marginal and low-paid work with greater vulnerability to unemployment. Low pay in the jobs they have also leads to higher rates of poverty. Human capital accounts for some of this disadvantage; other factors include social networks, knowledge and understanding of the labour market and language fluency. There is also evidence to support claims that some Muslims face both an ethnic and a religion penalty in the labour market. The research suggests that discrimination on the grounds of religion, particularly for women who wear the veil, is an important contributor to any religion penalty. For Muslim women other factors include cultural preferences concerning family and child care. Across the 11 cities, a range of different measures are being taken to support labour-market participation, including initiatives that work with Muslim communities and recognise the role they have in ensuring advice and information reaches those who are furthest from the labour market. Cities are also major employers and some are taking steps to ensure that their workforce reflects the full diversity of the local population.