

3. COHESION, BELONGING, DISCRIMINATION AND INTERACTIONS

Later chapters of this report examine integration in specific policy areas (employment, education, health, housing and policing) or spheres of activity (civil and political participation), but the focus here is on more general experiences and measures of integration. This chapter, using data from the OSI survey, begins by examining levels of cohesion in the 11 cities. It then looks at respondents' sense of personal identity and belonging to the neighbourhood, city and state. These are important elements, as an individual may be integrated into the labour market but may not identify with the area, city or country in which he or she lives.⁸⁰ The chapter then turns to perceptions and experiences of discrimination and unfair treatment. The CBPs recognise that unfair treatment and discrimination can be a barrier to full participation. The chapter concludes by looking at interactions of respondents with people from a different ethnic or religious group to themselves. The CBPs refer to the importance of "frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens" as a "fundamental mechanism for integration". There is also evidence that meaningful contact and interaction between people of different ethnic and cultural groups can help overcome prejudice and challenge the stereotypes that form the basis of discrimination.⁸¹ The results from the questionnaires are analysed to see where the views of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents coincide and where they differ. In some instances, differences in the Muslim sample are explored further: in particular, differences between male and female respondents, and those born in the EU state where the research is carried out and those born abroad. In asking the questions, a distinction was made between a person's "neighbourhood", that is the few streets immediately around where they live, and their "local area", the area within 15–20 minutes walking distance of their home. The questionnaire data are supplemented by insights from the focus groups, and interviews with key stakeholders that were carried out across the 11 cities.

3.1 Cohesion

Research suggesting that ethnic diversity undermines social cohesion remains controversial.⁸² Several questions from the OSI questionnaire explore levels of social cohesion in a neighbourhood and local area. These includes questions about the extent

⁸⁰ F. Heckmann, and W. Bosswick, *Integration and Integration Policies*, an INTPOL feasibility study for the IMESCO Network of Excellence, 2005, available at <http://www.imiscoe.org> (accessed November 2009).

⁸¹ T. F. Pettigrew and L. R. Tropp, "A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), 2006, pp. 751–783.

⁸² See R.D. Putnam, "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century. The 2006 Johan Skytte prize lecture", *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30(2), 2007, 137–174; N. Letki, "Does diversity erode social cohesion? Social capital and race in British neighbourhoods", *Political Studies* 56(1), 2008, 99–126.

to which people feel that others in their neighbourhood are willing to help and support each other and the extent to which it is felt that people of different backgrounds get on well together in their local area.⁸³ Other indicators of cohesion covered by the questionnaire are the perceptions of close bonds, trust and shared values among people in the neighbourhood. The picture to emerge from the OSI survey is mixed. There are both positive indications of high levels of social cohesion as well as signs that further efforts to develop and support cohesion may be needed.

The most positive indicators of cohesion are in response to the questions of whether people in a neighbourhood are willing to help each other and whether people from different backgrounds get on well together in the local area. Three-quarters of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents across the 11 cities “agree” or “strongly agree” that people in the neighbourhood are willing to help each other.⁸⁴

A significant majority of Muslim (69 per cent) and non-Muslim (67 per cent) respondents also “agree” or “strongly agree” that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together.

⁸³ The two questions measure similar attitudes and views, however, the first focuses on the *neighbourhood* level (where it may be more realistic to expect to give and receive support and help from others); the second probes the respondent’s more general perception of relations between people of different backgrounds in their wider *local area*.

⁸⁴ See Table 2 for more detailed tables of OSI research.

Table 3. Do people from different backgrounds get on well together here? (D2)

| | | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|--|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Strongly agree | | 13.3% | 11.4% | 12.3% |
| Agree | | 55.7% | 55.3% | 55.5% |
| Disagree | | 18.1% | 19.0% | 18.6% |
| Strongly disagree | | 3.6% | 4.0% | 3.8% |
| Don't know | | 7.9% | 8.6% | 8.3% |
| Too few people in this local area | | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.9% |
| People in this area are all from the same background | | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.6% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1109 | 1089 | 2198 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

Among both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, a greater proportion of those born in the country compared with those born abroad agreed that their local area was one where people from different backgrounds got on well together.

Table 4. Do people from different backgrounds get on well together here? (breakdown by religion and birthplace) (D2)

| | | Muslims born in the EU state | Muslims born outside the EU state | Non- Muslims born in the EU state | Non- Muslims born outside the EU state | Total |
|---|-----------------|------------------------------------|---|--|---|---------------|
| Strongly agree | | 13.2% | 13.3% | 11.7% | 10.4% | 12.3% |
| Agree | | 62.4% | 52.4% | 56.1% | 53.2% | 55.5% |
| Disagree | | 15.3% | 19.5% | 18.3% | 20.9% | 18.6% |
| Strongly disagree | | 2.4% | 4.2% | 3.7% | 5.1% | 3.8% |
| Don't know | | 5.6% | 9.1% | 8.7% | 8.4% | 8.3% |
| Too few people in this local area | | 0.5% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 0.9% |
| People in this area are all from the same background | | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 1.0% | 0.6% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 372 | 737 | 792 | 297 | 2198 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, on questions whether the local community is “close-knit“, whether people can be trusted or have shared values, the answers are generally less positive and differences emerge in the views of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. A closer examination of the number of respondents who “agree” or “strongly agree” that they live in a close-knit neighbourhood reveals that this view is supported by a greater proportion of Muslim respondents (50 per cent) than non-Muslim respondents (41 per cent).⁸⁵

In Leicester, Berlin and Rotterdam the majority of both Muslims and non-Muslims hold this view. Marseille was the only city where non-Muslim respondents were more likely than Muslims to feel that the neighbourhood was close-knit. Amsterdam had the highest proportion of Muslims (61 per cent) who viewed the neighbourhood as close-knit. Along with Antwerp, it was the city where the views of Muslims and non-Muslims differed the most. In Amsterdam, Muslims from a Moroccan background were more likely than those from Turkey to think the community was close-knit.

⁸⁵ See Table 5. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Levels of Trust

Levels of trust also appear to be high. There are, however, differences between the views of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. Over half of all respondents felt that either “many” (29 per cent) or “some” (45 per cent) people in their neighbourhood could be trusted.

Table 6. Trust in local population (C9)

| | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|---|-----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted | 21.4% | 35.8% | 28.5% |
| Some can be trusted | 45.9% | 44.0% | 45.0% |
| A few can be trusted | 26.3% | 17.4% | 21.9% |
| None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted | 6.4% | 2.7% | 4.6% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1093 | 2165 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, a greater proportion of non-Muslims (36 per cent) than Muslims (21 per cent) hold that “many” people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. Non-Muslims are 1.7 times more likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood (36 per cent non-Muslim respondents compared with 21 per cent of Muslim respondents), while Muslims are more likely to feel that “a few” can be trusted, and more likely to feel that “none” can be trusted (6 per cent Muslim, 3 per cent non-Muslim). These finds appear to be consistent with findings from the UK’s Home Office Citizenship Survey that Muslims (as well as Hindus and Sikhs) were significantly less likely than the general population to say that people in their neighbourhood could be trusted.⁸⁶ Responses do not differ greatly by gender, or place of birth for Muslims. However, among non-Muslim respondents, those born in the country are more likely (39 per cent) than those born abroad (26 per cent) to say that “many” people in the neighbourhood can be trusted.

⁸⁶ S. Kitchen, J. Michaelson, and N. Wood, *2005 Citizenship Survey: Community Cohesion Topic Report*, Department of Communities and Local Government, London, 2006, Table 17.

Table 7. Trust in local population (breakdown by religion and birthplace) (C9)

| | Muslims born in the EU state | Muslims born outside the EU state | Non- Muslims born in the EU state | Non- Muslims born outside the EU state | Total |
|---|------------------------------------|---|--|---|---------------|
| Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted | 18.7% | 22.8% | 39.5% | 26.2% | 28.5% |
| Some can be trusted | 48.1% | 44.9% | 42.9% | 46.9% | 45.0% |
| A few can be trusted | 28.3% | 25.2% | 16.5% | 20.1% | 21.9% |
| None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted | 4.9% | 7.1% | 1.2% | 6.8% | 4.6% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 364 | 729 | 778 | 294 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

Age is an important factor when it comes to determining levels of trust, particularly among the non-Muslim respondents. In general, the older age groups are more likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood than the younger age groups. Muslim respondents aged over 60 are 2.5 times more likely than those aged less than 20 to feel that “many” people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. For non-Muslims, they are three times more likely to do so.⁸⁷

This suggests that more may need to be done to support the development of trust among younger people.

Visible religious identity does not appear to have any significant impact on whether Muslims and non-Muslims trust their neighbours. In the Muslim group, respondents who display religious symbols are fractionally more likely to feel “some” people in the neighbourhood can be trusted, and fractionally less likely to feel a “few” or “none” can be trusted, in comparison with Muslims who display no religious symbols.

⁸⁷ See Table 8. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Table 9. Trust in local population (C9)

| | | Yes | No | Total |
|------------|---|-----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Muslim | Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted | 21.4% | 21.5% | 21.4% |
| | Some can be trusted | 48.5% | 44.4% | 45.9% |
| | A few can be trusted | 24.9% | 27.0% | 26.2% |
| | None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted | 5.2% | 7.1% | 6.4% |
| | Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 402 | 689 | 1091 |
| Non-Muslim | Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted | 37.0% | 35.9% | 36.0% |
| | Some can be trusted | 41.3% | 44.0% | 43.9% |
| | A few can be trusted | 15.2% | 17.5% | 17.4% |
| | None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted | 6.5% | 2.5% | 2.7% |
| | Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 46 | 1022 | 1068 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

When looking at all the cities, it is noted that levels of trust are high in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Leicester and Stockholm. In these cities over a quarter of Muslim and non-Muslim residents felt that “many” people in the neighbourhood could be trusted. Levels of trust are particularly low in Marseille and London, where close to one-third of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents said that “few” people in their neighbourhood can be trusted.

Looking at employment some clear patterns emerge within the Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Within the Muslim group, respondents who displayed the highest levels of trust in their neighbours were those who were retired. This fits with earlier findings in which Muslims in the oldest age group tended to be those who trusted their neighbours the most. Muslims who displayed the lowest levels of trust tended to be

employed in a family business, be self-employed, or else were at home looking after the family.⁸⁸

In the non-Muslim group, respondents who felt “many” people could be trusted outnumbered those who only felt “a few” could be trusted in all groups barring those who were unemployed, at home looking after the family and permanently sick or disabled.

The views of both Muslims and non-Muslims are fairly similar on the question of whether people in the neighbourhood would work together to improve the neighbourhood. A majority of Muslim respondents (51 per cent) and 46 per cent of non-Muslim respondents did not think they would. Only 37 per cent of Muslim and 39 per cent of non-Muslim respondents agreed or strongly agreed that people would work to improve the neighbourhood.⁸⁹

For both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, the sense of trust in their neighbours increases the longer they have lived in the area. In the Muslim group, those who have lived in the area for 31+ years are over twice as likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood than those who have lived there for less than a year. In the non-Muslim group, the linear relationship is initially distorted by the very high proportion of respondents who trust “many people” in the area, but who have lived in the area for less than a year. Similarly, the proportion of respondents who trust “none” of their neighbours does not fall in accordance with the length of time lived in the area, as it does with the Muslim respondents. This suggests that length of residence impacts more directly on Muslim respondents’ sense of trust than non-Muslims.⁹⁰

The ethnic and religious composition of the neighbourhood also appears to affect levels of trust. Muslim respondents who see the local population as consisting mainly of their relatives, or of people sharing the same ethnicity and religion, are those most likely to trust “many people” in the neighbourhood. Muslim respondents who see the population as consisting of a mix of ethnicities and religions, or of people with a different ethnicity and religion from their own are least likely to trust any of their neighbours. In the non-Muslim group, those who see the local population as consisting mainly of people from a different ethnic and religious background are the group least likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood. Those who see the population as consisting mainly of people who share their ethnic and religious background, or just ethnic background, are those most likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood. This may indicate that the ethnicity of the neighbours plays an important role in Muslims’ and non-Muslims’ sense of trust. Further analysis shows that the sense of trust increases substantially if respondents feel that others in the

⁸⁸ See Table 10. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁸⁹ See Table 11. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹⁰ See Table 12. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

neighbourhood share the same values as them. This variable shows the clearest correlation yet with respondents' sense of trust in their neighbours.⁹¹

Shared Values

The CBPs provide that integration “implies respect for the basic values of the European Union” and that “everybody resident in the EU must adapt and adhere closely to the basic values of the European Union”. The TEU makes it clear that “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”.⁹² The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum also invites Member States to develop policies that stress respect for the fundamental values of the union.⁹³

In the OSI questionnaires, findings on whether respondents felt that people in their neighbourhood shared the same values are the least positive. The majority of respondents, both Muslim (50 per cent) and non-Muslim (55 per cent), do not think that people in the neighbourhood share the same values.

Table 14. Do people in this neighbourhood share the same values? (C10)

| | | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Strongly agree | | 4.0% | 3.1% | 3.6% |
| Agree | | 34.8% | 25.0% | 29.9% |
| Disagree | | 39.3% | 41.8% | 40.6% |
| Strongly disagree | | 10.6% | 13.4% | 12.0% |
| Don't know | | 11.4% | 16.6% | 14.0% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1109 | 1088 | 2197 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

When looking at all the 11 cities, some differences emerge. Leicester emerges as a city with the highest proportion of Muslim (53 per cent) and non-Muslim (34 per cent) respondents agreeing that people share the same values. In Marseille, two-thirds of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents agreed that people in the neighbourhood do not share the same values.

⁹¹ See Table 13. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹² TEU, article 2.

⁹³ Council of the European Union, European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, document 13440/08, 24 September 2008, available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st13/st13440.en08.pdf> (accessed November 2009), p. 6.

While many respondents do not feel that people in their neighbourhood share the same values, the data from the questionnaires do indicate that the respondents identify similar values as important to the country where they live. Furthermore, these values correspond to those that are identified as core European values, such as respect for the law, freedom of expression and equality of opportunity. Respondents were asked to identify the four values that they felt were the most important national values for the country in which they lived. Muslims and non-Muslim agree that freedom of expression, respect for the law and equality of opportunity are key national values, although for Muslim respondents respect for the law (64 per cent) was identified more frequently than freedom of expression (50 per cent), while for non-Muslims, freedom of expression (62 per cent) came ahead of respect for the law (54 per cent). A similar proportion of both Muslims (41 per cent) and non-Muslims (44 per cent) cited equality of opportunity. A significant difference between the two groups emerged in relation to respect for faiths and tolerance towards others. For Muslims, “respect for all faiths” came second, after respect of the law, as a key national value. It was identified as an important national value by 52 per cent of Muslim respondents but only 29 per cent of non-Muslim respondents. In fact the gap between the two groups is greatest for this value. Of non-Muslim respondents 50 per cent identified “tolerance towards others” as an important national value compared with 37 per cent of Muslim respondents.

Table 15. Most important national values of living in the country (D8)

| | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Respect for the law | 64.3% | 54.0% | 1300 |
| Tolerance towards others | 37.4% | 49.9% | 956 |
| Freedom of speech and expression | 49.5% | 61.5% | 1217 |
| Respect for all faiths | 51.6% | 29.1% | 889 |
| Justice and fair play | 28.7% | 36.9% | 719 |
| Speaking the national language | 33.0% | 31.4% | 707 |
| Respect of people of different ethnic groups | 31.2% | 28.5% | 655 |
| Equality of opportunity | 41.3% | 44.1% | 937 |
| Pride in this country/patriotism | 8.5% | 12.4% | 229 |
| Voting in elections | 19.2% | 21.4% | 445 |
| Freedom from discrimination | 27.7% | 27.4% | 605 |
| Total | 1110 | 1085 | 2195 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

When country of birth is taken into account, differences emerge in the views of Muslims born in the country and those born abroad. In particular, 48 per cent of Muslims born in the country identify equality of opportunity as a key value, compared with 38 per cent of those born abroad.⁹⁴

Further analysis which controls for religion, country of birth and gender shows that Muslim men born in the country are more likely than women or respondents born abroad and non-Muslims to cite freedom from discrimination as a key value.⁹⁵

Another difference that emerges once religion, gender and country of birth are taken into account is the high proportion of Muslim women born overseas (41 per cent) who identify learning the national language as a key national value, compared with Muslim men born abroad, those born in the country and non-Muslims.

The results present a complex picture, suggesting that a sense of shared values is not needed for people of different backgrounds to get on and help their neighbours. However, there appears to be a greater correlation between levels of trust and perceptions of whether people are willing to work together to improve the neighbourhood as well as a belief that people in neighbourhood share the same values. While freedom of expression, respect for the law and equal opportunities are values that are identified as important national values by Muslims and non-Muslims, a greater divergence exists in relation to respect for faiths.

3.2 Belonging

Belonging to the local area

The OSI survey asked respondents about their sense of belonging to their local area, the city and the country. The results show that a sense of belonging to the local area is strong and does not differ by religion.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ See Table 16. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹⁵ See Table 17. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹⁶ 28% of Muslims and non-Muslims felt a “very strong” sense of local belonging, while 43% felt a “fairly strong” sense of belonging, 20% “not very strongly”, and 6% “not strongly at all”.

Table 18. How strongly do you feel you belong to local area? (D4)

| | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Very strongly | 28.1% | 27.8% | 27.9% |
| Fairly strongly | 42.5% | 44.0% | 43.3% |
| Not very strongly | 19.7% | 20.4% | 20.1% |
| Not at all strongly | 7.3% | 6.0% | 6.6% |
| Don't know | 2.3% | 1.8% | 2.1% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1110 | 1088 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

There is some difference between the response by gender and place of birth. Men were more likely than women to express a “very strong” sense of local belonging.⁹⁷

Those born in the country were more likely than those born abroad to have a “very” or “fairly” strong sense of local belonging.⁹⁸

The sense of belonging to the city was generally very strong. This supports the recent emphasis at the European level on the integration strategies of cities. In Antwerp over 90 per cent of respondents expressed a “very strong” or “fairly strong” sense of local belonging. This was also true for over two-thirds of respondents in all the other cities except Paris, Marseille and Stockholm. These results reflect the strong sense of submunicipal identity that exists in many cities, reflected in for example, the *kriezdenken* (neighbourhood culture) in Berlin.

Belonging to the city

Several observations can be made about the sense of belonging to the city. First, over three-quarters of Muslims and non-Muslims share a “very strong” or “fairly strong” sense of belonging to their city.

⁹⁷ See Table 19. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹⁸ See Table 20. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Table 21. How strongly do you feel you belong to the city? (D5)

| | | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Very strongly | | 29.9% | 36.6% | 33.2% |
| Fairly strongly | | 42.3% | 39.7% | 41.0% |
| Not very strongly | | 19.0% | 18.7% | 18.8% |
| Not at all strongly | | 6.7% | 4.0% | 5.3% |
| Don't know | | 2.1% | 1.1% | 1.6% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1110 | 1087 | 2197 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

For Muslims the pattern of belonging to the city is consistent with their attachment to the local area. Non-Muslim respondents, however, identify more intensely with the city than the local area. A breakdown by city finds that in seven of the 11 cities, Muslim respondents have a greater sense of belonging to the local area than the city. In Amsterdam, for both Muslims and non-Muslims, a strong sense of belonging to the local area is supplemented by an even stronger sense of belonging to the city. This may be one effect of a municipal campaign that emphasises an inclusive common city identity. In Stockholm, Paris and Marseille, the sense of belonging to the city was higher than for the local area. However, for the two French cities, the sense of local belonging was particularly low and compared with other cities, city-level belonging among both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents is low.⁹⁹ Furthermore, for both Muslims and non-Muslims, a greater proportion of those born in the country have a “very strong” sense of belonging to the city compared with those born abroad.

⁹⁹ In Marseille, 55% of Muslim and 68% of non-Muslims respondents said they have a “very” or “fairly strong” sense of belonging to the city, in Paris this response was given by 54% of Muslim and 62% of non-Muslim respondents.

**Table 22. How strongly do you feel you belong to the city?
(breakdown by religion and birthplace) (D5)**

| | | Muslims born in the EU state | Muslims born outside the EU state | Non- Muslims born in the EU state | Non- Muslims born outside the EU state | Total |
|---------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------|---|--|---|---------------|
| Very strongly | | 35.1% | 27.3% | 39.4% | 29.3% | 33.2% |
| Fairly strongly | | 45.0% | 41.0% | 38.7% | 42.1% | 41.0% |
| Not very strongly | | 13.7% | 21.7% | 17.6% | 21.5% | 18.8% |
| Not at all strongly | | 3.5% | 8.3% | 3.0% | 6.4% | 5.3% |
| Don't know | | 2.7% | 1.8% | 1.3% | 0.7% | 1.6% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 373 | 737 | 790 | 297 | 2197 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

National Belonging

When it comes to the question of a sense of national belonging, a more complex picture emerges. A majority of both Muslim (61.3 per cent) and non-Muslim (73 per cent) respondents shared a “very” or “fairly” strong sense of national belonging.

Table 23. How strongly do you feel you belong to the country? (D6)

| | | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Very strongly | | 24.4% | 35.9% | 30.1% |
| Fairly strongly | | 36.9% | 35.6% | 36.3% |
| Not very strongly | | 25.1% | 20.4% | 22.8% |
| Not at all strongly | | 10.1% | 6.4% | 8.3% |
| Don't know | | 3.4% | 1.7% | 2.5% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1110 | 1088 | 2198 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, Non-Muslim respondents (36 per cent) are more likely than Muslim respondents (24 per cent) to say they have a “very strong” sense of national belonging; 36 per cent of Muslim respondents said that their sense of belonging to the country is “not very” or “not at all” strong, compared with 27 per cent of non-Muslim respondents. Country of birth and gender also affect outcomes for a sense of belonging. When looking at the Muslim and non-Muslim groups, in each group women born in

the country have a greater sense of national belonging than male respondents or respondents born abroad.¹⁰⁰

It is clear from the data for all 11 cities that for Muslims local and city-level belonging is stronger than national belonging. For non-Muslims, the levels of national belonging are greater than, or around the same as, city or local belonging. The three exceptions to this are Berlin, Hamburg and Stockholm. In the case of Hamburg, a greater sense of national belonging was found among Muslim respondents (52 per cent) than non-Muslim respondents (36 per cent).

National and Cultural Identification

The OSI survey also examined cultural identification: the extent to which respondents see themselves and feel others see them as nationals (that is, British, French, German, etc.). The survey found that 49 per cent of Muslim respondents expressed cultural identification with the state (saw themselves as British, French, etc.).

Table 25. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.]? (D9)

| | | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|-------|----------|--------|------------|--------|
| Yes | | 49.0% | 77.1% | 63.0% |
| No | | 51.0% | 22.9% | 37.0% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1105 | 1087 | 2192 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, only 24 per cent felt that others saw them as nationals.

Table 26. Do most other people in this country see you as [British, French, etc.]? (D10)

| | | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|-------|----------|--------|------------|--------|
| Yes | | 24.5% | 74.8% | 49.5% |
| No | | 75.5% | 25.2% | 50.5% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1101 | 1084 | 2185 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

¹⁰⁰ 69% of Muslim and 75% of non-Muslim women born in the country felt a “very” or “fairly” strong sense of national belonging compared to 73% of non-Muslim men and 63% of Muslim men born in the country. See Table 24. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

The gap identified by these findings should be of particular concern to policymakers, as it suggests that there are a significant group of Muslims in these cities who see themselves as nationals but do not feel others see them in this way.

Results in the 11 cities differ substantially.¹⁰¹ Cities where the majority of Muslim respondents saw themselves as nationals included Leicester (82 per cent), London (72 per cent), Amsterdam (59 per cent), Marseille (58 per cent) and Antwerp (55 per cent). Cities where only a minority of Muslims saw themselves as nationals were Hamburg (22 per cent), Berlin (25 per cent), Copenhagen (40 per cent), Paris (41 per cent), Stockholm (41 per cent) and Rotterdam (43 per cent).

The two English cities, London and Leicester, had the largest proportion of Muslim respondents who saw themselves as nationals (82 per cent in Leicester and 72 per cent in London) as well as the highest proportion of Muslim respondents (40 per cent) who felt that they were likely to be seen as nationals by others in their country. However, these are also the cities where difference between how respondents perceived themselves and how they felt others perceived them was greatest.

Comments in the focus groups also reveal how the desire to be seen as belonging, combined with the anxiety that one will never be accepted, can be a source of frustration:

No, no they don't see us as British. Not only that, even our children's children and no matter how many generations will go, I am fearful they will never see us as British [...] in some cases I think they are just tolerating us as opposed to accepting us and there's a big difference. (OSI focus group participant, Leicester)

Few Muslim respondents in the two German cities, Hamburg and Berlin, saw themselves as German (25 per cent in Berlin and 22 per cent in Hamburg) and even fewer felt that they were seen as German by others (11 per cent in Berlin and 11 per cent in Hamburg). At the same time, for these two cities, the gap between how the respondents' sense of cultural identification and how they anticipated others seeing them is among the narrowest.¹⁰²

As may be expected, the country of birth correlates with a sense of national identification: just over two-thirds of European-born Muslims felt a sense of national identification, compared with less than 40 per cent of those born abroad.¹⁰³

In most cities a majority of Muslims born in the country expressed a sense of national cultural identification. This was not, however, true for Hamburg and Berlin.¹⁰⁴ In Berlin, only 35 per cent of German-born Muslims identified themselves as German; in Hamburg,

¹⁰¹ See Table 27. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹⁰² Antwerp 35%; Amsterdam 28% Paris and Marseille 25%; Rotterdam and Stockholm 18%; Copenhagen 15%.

¹⁰³ See Table 28. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹⁰⁴ See Table 29. and Table 30. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

this figure was 46 per cent. By contrast, 94 per cent of Leicester's UK-born Muslims said they saw themselves as British. Although the majority of Muslim respondents did not believe others saw them as British, Muslims born in the EU states were 2.2 times more likely to respond positively in comparison with those born elsewhere.

There is a clear correlation amongst Muslim respondents between educational achievement and cultural identification, whereby those with higher levels of education are more likely to see themselves as nationals.

Table 31. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.], Muslim respondents by highest level of education completed (I11)

| | Yes | No | Total |
|---------------------|-------|-------|--------|
| No formal education | 30.8% | 69.2% | 100.0% |
| Primary | 42.0% | 58.0% | 100.0% |
| Secondary | 51.9% | 48.1% | 100.0% |
| University | 54.1% | 45.9% | 100.0% |

Source: Open Society Institute data

The data suggests that increased levels of education correlate with a greater sense of cultural identification with the state. For example, while less than one third (30.8 per cent) of those with no formal education see themselves as nationals, over half (54.1 per cent) of those with a university degree see themselves as nationals. A similar pattern can be seen when figures for respondents who felt they are viewed by others as being British, French, or German, etc. are examined.

Table 32. Do most other people in this country see you as [British, French, etc.], Muslim respondents by level of education completed (D10)

| | Yes | No | Total |
|---------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|
| No formal education | 15.4% | 84.6% | 100.0% |
| Primary | 19.4% | 80.6% | 100.0% |
| Secondary | 25.0% | 75.0% | 100.0% |
| University | 29.9% | 70.1% | 100.0% |
| Total | Per cent | 24.5% | 75.5% |
| | Count | 269 | 830 |
| | | | 1099 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

The data also indicate that employment, particularly full-time employment, is a key factor for whether or not a person culturally identifies himself or herself as a national of the country, and whether he or she feels others see them in the same way.¹⁰⁵

Of Muslims in full-time employment, 55.3 per cent culturally identify themselves as nationals, as do 55.1 per cent of Muslims in full-time education. By contrast, only 34.8 per cent of Muslims who are retired and 41.5 per cent of Muslims who are at home looking after house and family do the same. Muslims in full-time employment, training or education are the only groups where the majority of people see themselves as being nationals. Those who are in part-time employment, or are unemployed and looking for work are almost equally divided over whether or not they feel themselves nationals. Aside from those working unpaid in family businesses (too few numbers to be statistically significant), the groups with the lowest proportions of respondents who see themselves as nationals are those who are self-employed, retired or at home looking after the family. Those in full-time and part-time employment and students are most likely to feel that others consider them to be nationals of the country. In contrast, those who are permanently sick, are at home with the family or self-employed are only half as likely as the first three groups to feel the same way.

In the context of increased hostility to visible manifestations of religious identity, one important finding from the survey is that neither visible religious identity nor active religious practice makes any significant statistical impact on respondents' cultural identification).¹⁰⁶

**Table 37. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.],
Muslim respondents by display of visible religious identity (D9)**

| | | Yes | No | Total |
|-------|----------|-------|-------|--------|
| Yes | | 48.2% | 51.8% | 100.0% |
| No | | 49.6% | 50.4% | 100.0% |
| Total | Per cent | 49.0% | 51.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 541 | 562 | 1103 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

¹⁰⁵ See Table 33. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹⁰⁶ This is consistent with analysis of the British Home Office Citizenship survey which finds that "religious practice" makes no difference to identification with Britain among South Asian and Caribbean groups, Rahsaan Maxwell, "Caribbean and South Asian identification with British society: the importance of perceived discrimination", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, forthcoming in 2009 (hereafter, Maxwell, "Caribbean and South Asian identification with British society"). Also see Table 34., Table 35. and Table 36. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

The OSI survey indicates differences between levels of national belonging and national cultural identification. In most cities, a greater proportion of Muslim respondents indicated a sense of belonging to the country than a cultural identification of themselves as nationals. For example, in Amsterdam, 79 per cent of Muslim respondents felt a “very” or “fairly” strong sense of belonging to the Netherlands, but only 59 per cent identified themselves as Dutch. The qualitative data from focus groups also indicate that it is possible for a person to have a sense of belonging to the country without culturally identifying himself or herself as a national: “Being German means ethnicity, that’s why I can’t be German, but I can be a German citizen.” The exceptions to this are the French and British cities, particularly Paris and Leicester, where levels of cultural identification as French or British were higher than respondents’ sense of belonging to France or the UK. In Paris a majority of Muslim respondents (58 per cent) regarded themselves as French, but only a minority (40 per cent) felt they belonged to France. In Leicester, 73 per cent of Muslim respondents had a sense of belonging to the UK while an even higher proportion, 83 per cent, saw themselves as British.

Barriers to National Belonging and Identification

The research findings suggest that the focus on acquiring the skills to speak the national language in the CBPs and the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum is shared by Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims (21 per cent) and non-Muslims (34 per cent) share the view that not speaking the national language is the most significant barrier to being seen as nationals.

Table 38. What is the main barrier to being [British, French, etc.]? (D13)

| | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Not speaking the national | 21.0% | 34.3% | 27.6% |
| Being born abroad | 10.1% | 6.2% | 8.1% |
| Being from an ethnic | 20.8% | 13.0% | 16.9% |
| Accent/way of speaking | 3.1% | 3.6% | 3.4% |
| Not being Christian | 5.9% | 0.5% | 3.2% |
| There aren’t any barriers | 5.4% | 7.1% | 6.3% |
| None of these | 3.3% | 7.0% | 5.1% |
| Don’t Know | 3.7% | 4.3% | 4.0% |
| Other | 26.8% | 24.1% | 25.4% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1102 | 1072 |
| | | 2174 | |

Source: Open Society Institute data

For non-Muslims, the results for the effect of the country of birth are that those born in the country (40 per cent) are twice as likely to view a lack of competence in the national language as a barrier to belonging as those born outside the country (20 per cent).¹⁰⁷

Muslim and non-Muslims held similar views on the importance of speaking the national language and that this was an important national value. When asked what they considered to be the most important national values, 366 Muslim respondents and 341 non-Muslim respondents chose “speaking the national language” as one of their four options at 33 per cent and 31.4 per cent of the total for each group.¹⁰⁸

Further analysis of the respondents showed that Muslims and non-Muslim women born outside the EU state were those most likely to select language as a key value, while Muslims and non-Muslims aged 20–29 years was the age group most likely to consider national language an important value.

Table 40. Importance of national language as a cultural value (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (D8)

| | Speaking the national language is one of the most important national values |
|---|---|
| Muslim Male born in the EU state | 29.60% |
| Muslim Female born in the EU state | 30.90% |
| Muslim Male born outside the EU state | 28.30% |
| Muslim Female born outside the EU state | 41.10% |
| Non-Muslim Male born in the EU state | 28.30% |
| Non-Muslim Female born in the EU state | 31.90% |
| Non-Muslim Male born outside the EU state | 33.30% |
| Non-Muslim Female born outside the EU state | 36.10% |
| Total count | 707 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

The distribution of educational qualifications among the language respondents mirrors that of the entire sample. In terms of economic status, Muslims who are employed part-time, retired, unemployed or at home looking after the family are slightly more likely than the average to consider language a key national value.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ See Table 39. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹⁰⁸ For more information see Table 15.

¹⁰⁹ See Table 41. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Far fewer non-Muslims (13 per cent) than Muslims (21 per cent) see ethnicity as a barrier to national belonging.¹¹⁰

However, the views of non-Muslims differ by country of birth, with those born outside the country (18 per cent) more likely than those born in the country (11 per cent) to feel that ethnicity or race exclude people from national belonging.

The views of non-Muslim respondents born abroad are closer to those of Muslim respondents. Among Muslim respondents, the perception of ethnicity as a barrier to national cultural identification differs by gender and country of birth. Men and those born in Europe are more likely to see ethnicity as a barrier to inclusion, and almost a third (32 per cent) of European-born Muslim men feel that “ethnicity/not being white” is the main barrier to being seen as nationals.¹¹¹

This is expressed by one respondent from Hamburg in the following terms: “It doesn’t matter where I come from. As long as I am black I am an African.” Thus, for Muslims and non-Muslims having been born abroad and not speaking the national language, although it is an important factor of exclusion or inclusion, sits alongside being from an ethnic minority or not being white. Very few non-Muslims (1 per cent) and Muslims (6 per cent) think that not being Christian is a barrier to national belonging.

The findings in the OSI survey are consistent with the analysis of the European Social Survey, which suggests that alongside education and employment, language and cultural values are important symbolic boundaries for national belonging in Europe:

As second generations of non-white and non-Christian immigrants come of age, racial and religious distinctions may not only become less conspicuous but also less politically tenable. While public discourse necessarily shifts from the accommodation to the integration of immigrant populations, natives may become more concerned about the longevity of their linguistic and cultural identity. Or, natives may realize that language and culture guarantee the privileges of group status that were previously “protected” by race or religion.¹¹²

Of course, such boundaries may provide a mask for racial and religious discrimination.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ For more information see Table 38.

¹¹¹ See Table 42. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹¹² Christopher Bail, “The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries Against Immigrants in Europe”, *American Sociological Review* 73, 2008, pp. 37–59, p. 55 (hereafter, Bail, “The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries”).

¹¹³ Bail, “The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries”, p. 56.

3.3 Discrimination

The Fundamental Rights Agency's European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS)¹¹⁴ provides the most comprehensive and coherent set of data on Muslim experiences of discrimination. A preliminary analysis of data from 14 countries¹¹⁵ finds that "discrimination in employment and private services tend to dominate people's experiences of everyday discrimination".¹¹⁶

Understanding the nature of discrimination Muslims face is important, as EU Directives only require states to protect against discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in relation to employment, while ethnic and racial discrimination is prohibited in a wider range of areas, including housing, education and the provision of goods and services. This may reflect the fact that across Europe ethnic discrimination is viewed as the most widespread form of discrimination. In the Eurobarometer Survey, 62 per cent of respondents agreed that ethnic discrimination was widespread.¹¹⁷ Similar findings emerge from the OSI survey, where 75 per cent of respondents said that there was either "a lot" (30 per cent) or a "fair amount" (45 per cent) of racial prejudice in the country; 17 per cent felt there was "a little" and 2 per cent thought there was no racial prejudice.

In the Eurobarometer survey, 48 per cent felt that racial prejudice is now more widespread compared with five years ago. In the OSI survey, the views of Muslims and non-Muslims differ on changes in the level of racial prejudice compared with five years ago.¹¹⁸

Muslims are more likely (55 per cent) than non-Muslims (43 per cent) to think that levels of racial prejudice had increased, while non-Muslim respondents (34 per cent) were more likely than Muslim respondents (24 per cent) to think the levels had stayed the same. In both groups a similar proportion (11 per cent of Muslims and 15 per cent of non-Muslims) felt that levels of racial prejudice had decreased over the previous five years.

¹¹⁴ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*, Vienna, FRA, 2009, available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/EU-MIDIS_MUSLIMS_EN.pdf (accessed November 2009, hereafter, FRA, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*). 23,500 immigrant and ethnic minority people were surveyed across all EU Member States in 2008. 5,000 people from the majority population living in the same areas as minorities were also interviewed in 10 Member States, to allow for comparisons of results concerning some key questions.

¹¹⁵ The analysis covers data from all the states covered by the OSI research with the exception of the UK. It also includes Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Slovenia, and Spain.

¹¹⁶ FRA, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*, p. 7.

¹¹⁷ European Commission, *Special Eurobarometer 296, Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions, Attitudes and Experiences*, Brussels, European Commission, 2008 (hereafter, Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*).

¹¹⁸ See Table 43. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

In the OSI survey, respondents were asked to identify the group most likely to be the target of racial prejudice.¹¹⁹ Although this was asked as an open question, 60 per cent of Muslim respondents and 40 per cent of non-Muslim respondents identified “Muslims” among the groups most likely to face racial prejudice. Almost half (45 per cent) of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents identified “black people” as the primary target of racial prejudice.

In the Eurobarometer survey, 42 per cent of respondents said that they felt discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief was widespread.¹²⁰ However, there was variation across countries. Discrimination based on religion/belief is seen as most widespread of all in Denmark (62 per cent), followed by France (57 per cent) and the UK (56 per cent).¹²¹ Overall, 38 per cent of respondents felt that religious discrimination was more widespread than five years ago.¹²² However, there are several countries where a majority of respondents consider religious discrimination to be more widespread than five years ago: the Netherlands, Denmark (66 per cent), the United Kingdom (53 per cent), France (51 per cent) and Belgium (51 per cent).¹²³

Table 45. How widespread is discrimination on the basis of religious belief?

| | Very widespread | Fairly widespread | Fairly rare | Very rare | Non-existent | Don't Know | Count |
|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|------------|-------|
| Belgium | 14% | 39% | 30% | 14% | 2% | 1% | 1012 |
| Denmark | 18% | 44% | 26% | 11% | – | 1% | 1032 |
| Germany | 6% | 28% | 38% | 24% | 2% | 2% | 1562 |
| France | 12% | 45% | 32% | 6% | 1% | 4% | 1054 |
| The Netherlands | 12% | 43% | 34% | 10% | – | 1% | 1023 |
| Sweden | 8% | 43% | 37% | 9% | – | 3% | 1007 |
| United Kingdom | 14% | 42% | 34% | 5% | 1% | 4% | 1306 |
| EU 27 | 9% | 33% | 34% | 17% | 4% | 3% | 26746 |

Source: Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions, Attitudes and Experiences*, 2008

¹¹⁹ See Table 44. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹²⁰ Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p.7.

¹²¹ Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p.66.

¹²² Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p.7.

¹²³ Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p.68.

Perceptions of the level of religious discrimination and prejudice were higher in the OSI survey, where 70 per cent of non-Muslim respondents felt that there was either “a lot” (29 per cent) or “a fair amount” (41 per cent) of religious prejudice in the country.

Table 46. Current level of religious prejudice in the country (H4)

| | | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|---------------|----------|--------|------------|--------|
| A lot | | 42.7% | 29.3% | 36.1% |
| A fair amount | | 37.1% | 41.1% | 39.1% |
| A little | | 11.8% | 18.3% | 15.0% |
| None | | 2.0% | 4.1% | 3.0% |
| Don't know | | 6.4% | 7.2% | 6.8% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1109 | 1089 | 2198 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

The majority of Muslim respondents (56 per cent) also said that religious prejudice had increased compared with five years ago.¹²⁴

Respondents were almost unanimous in identifying Muslims as the main target of religious prejudice. A quarter of non-Muslim respondents and 15 per cent of Muslim respondents also identified Jews as a target of religious prejudice.¹²⁵

The identification by respondents in the OSI survey of “Muslims” as the target of both racial and religious prejudice is an indication of the difficulties of disentangling ethnic from religious discrimination and suggests that Muslims face multiple or intersectional discrimination.¹²⁶ The FRA analysis for the EU-MIDIS data finds that in the preceding 12 months, a third of Muslims had reported experiencing discrimination based on ethnicity alone, while 10 per cent had identified religious discrimination alone.¹²⁷ However, the largest group, 43 per cent, encountered discrimination on the grounds of both race and religion.¹²⁸ Similarly, although a large proportion of Muslims

¹²⁴ See Table 47. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹²⁵ See Table 48. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹²⁶ The Eurobarometer survey finds that those who experience discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief are also the most likely to experience discrimination on multiple grounds, Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p. 15.

¹²⁷ In the Eurobarometer Survey, 12% of respondents who said they belonged to a religious minority reported experiencing discrimination on the grounds of religion in the preceding 12 months, Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p. 14.

¹²⁸ FRA, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*, p. 6.

in Europe are also migrants, the prejudice about Muslims is not the same as the prejudice towards migrants. Analysis of data from the European Values study shows that “aggregate levels of anti-Muslim prejudice were clearly higher than the levels of anti-immigrant prejudice”.¹²⁹

The OSI data also suggest differences in the perception of racial discrimination in the Muslim sample when gender and country of birth are considered. The data show that European-born Muslims are the group most likely (34 per cent) to feel that there is “a lot” of racial prejudice in the country, and Muslim men born abroad are the group least likely (26 per cent) to think there is “a lot” of racial prejudice in the country.¹³⁰

There were also differences in the Muslim sample in their perceptions of religious prejudice when gender and country of birth were considered. Half of European-born Muslims thought there was “a lot” of religious prejudice, compared with 40 per cent of Muslims born abroad.

Table 50. Current level of religious prejudice in the country (breakdown by religion and birthplace) (H4)

| | Muslims born in the EU state | Muslims born outside the EU state | Non-Muslims born in the EU state | Non-Muslims born outside the EU state | Total | |
|---------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| A lot | 49.7% | 39.2% | 29.2% | 29.6% | 36.1% | |
| A fair amount | 36.8% | 37.2% | 42.4% | 37.7% | 39.1% | |
| A little | 8.1% | 13.7% | 17.8% | 19.5% | 15.0% | |
| None | 1.6% | 2.2% | 3.8% | 5.1% | 3.0% | |
| Don't know | 3.8% | 7.7% | 6.8% | 8.1% | 6.8% | |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 372 | 737 | 792 | 297 | 2198 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

As for gender, European-born Muslim women are the most likely (51 per cent) to say there is “a lot” of religious prejudice in the country, and Muslim men born abroad are the least likely (38 per cent) to feel that there is “a lot” of religious prejudice. Among Muslim respondents, 75 per cent of European-born Muslims felt levels of prejudice had increased, compared with 65 per cent of Muslims born abroad.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Strabac & Listhung, “Anti-Muslim prejudice”, p. 281.

¹³⁰ See Table 49. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹³¹ See Table 51. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Respondents were asked about the frequency with which they had experienced different forms of discrimination in the preceding 12 months.¹³² Across each of the different “categories” of frequency, Muslims were more likely than non-Muslims to have experienced both racial and religious discrimination.

Table 52. How often have you experienced racial discrimination? (H7.3)

| | | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|------------------------|----------|--------|------------|--------|
| Almost all of the time | | 3.2% | 1.8% | 2.5% |
| A lot of the time | | 12.4% | 4.5% | 8.5% |
| Sometimes | | 28.3% | 14.3% | 21.4% |
| Rarely | | 18.1% | 14.4% | 16.2% |
| Never | | 38.0% | 65.1% | 51.4% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1108 | 1085 | 2193 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

Table 53. How often have you experienced religious discrimination? (H7.4)

| | | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total |
|------------------------|----------|--------|------------|--------|
| Almost all of the time | | 5.1% | 0.8% | 3.0% |
| A lot of the time | | 17.9% | 2.1% | 10.1% |
| Sometimes | | 26.7% | 5.7% | 16.3% |
| Rarely | | 15.3% | 10.5% | 12.9% |
| Never | | 35.0% | 80.9% | 57.7% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 1109 | 1087 | 2196 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

Non-Muslims were far more likely than Muslims not to have experienced racial or religious discrimination.

The frequency with which Muslims experience religious discrimination did differ among Muslim respondents. Half of Muslim respondents either did not encounter any religious discrimination (35 per cent) or encountered it rarely (15 per cent); 27 per

¹³² That is, whether they experienced it “almost all” of the time, “a lot” of the time, “sometimes” or “never”.

cent encountered religious discrimination “sometimes”, while 18 per cent experienced it “a lot of the time” and 5 per cent almost all the time. The proportion of Muslim respondents who experienced religious prejudice or unfair treatment “almost all” or “a lot” of the time did not vary by gender and country of birth. However, gender and country of birth was significant for those who reported experiencing such unfair treatment “sometimes”, “rarely” and “never”.¹³³

Among European-born Muslim respondents, men (29 per cent) but particularly women (35 per cent) are more likely than Muslim respondents born abroad to have experienced some form of religious discrimination in the previous 12 months. European-born Muslim women are also the least likely to report not having experienced religious discrimination in the previous 12 months (22 per cent) and Muslim men born abroad are the most likely not to have experienced any religious discrimination or prejudice.

Among Muslim respondents, experiences of racial discrimination are less frequent than religious discrimination, but they are still high.¹³⁴

Although more than half encounter racial discrimination “rarely” (18 per cent) or “not at all” (38 per cent), 28 per cent “sometimes” face racial discrimination while 12 per cent encounter it “a lot” and 3 per cent “almost all” of the time. Muslim men born abroad (19 per cent) are more likely than European-born Muslim men (16 per cent) or women (14 per cent) to be faced with racial discrimination “all” or “a lot” of the time.

A quarter of female respondents reported experiences of unfair treatment or prejudice based on gender at least sometimes in the preceding 12 months.

Table 56. How often have you experienced gender discrimination? (H7.1)

| | | Muslim male | Muslim female | Non-Muslim male | Non-Muslim female | Total |
|------------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Almost all of the time | | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.6% |
| A lot of the time | | 1.3% | 2.5% | 0.8% | 6.4% | 2.8% |
| Sometimes | | 5.9% | 12.2% | 6.2% | 19.6% | 11.1% |
| Rarely | | 10.5% | 18.5% | 13.1% | 21.4% | 15.9% |
| Never | | 81.8% | 66.1% | 79.6% | 51.9% | 69.6% |
| Total | Per cent | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | Count | 555 | 551 | 520 | 566 | 2192 |

Source: Open Society Institute data

¹³³ See Table 54. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹³⁴ See Table 55. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Muslim and non-Muslim respondents have similar experiences in respect to discrimination based on neighbourhood.¹³⁵

The general public, rather than a particular institution or professional setting, was identified by 28 per cent of Muslim respondents as the source of the religious discrimination they faced.

Table 58. Locations of religious discrimination (H8)

| | Muslim | Non-Muslim | Total count |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| A local doctor's surgery | 3.8% | 1.2% | 55 |
| A local hospital | 5.4% | 1.2% | 72 |
| A local school | 6.4% | 1.4% | 85 |
| A local council | 4.7% | 0.7% | 59 |
| A landlord or letting agent | 7.4% | 1.3% | 95 |
| A local shop | 6.3% | 2.5% | 95 |
| Public transport | 13.2% | 2.7% | 174 |
| Airline/airport officials | 7.2% | 1.3% | 93 |
| The courts (Magistrate Court and Crown Court) | 1.5% | 0.8% | 24 |
| The police | 9.2% | 3.4% | 137 |
| The immigration authorities | 3.5% | 0.4% | 43 |
| A member of the public | 27.7% | 11.2% | 422 |
| None of the above | 49.9% | 81.8% | 1407 |
| Total count | 1102 | 1048 | 2150 |

However, members of the general public featured most prominently in discrimination faced by European-born Muslim women; two-fifths (42 per cent) of the discrimination they faced comes from members of the public.¹³⁶

Public transport was identified by 13 per cent of Muslim respondents as a key space in which they encountered prejudice or unfair treatment. The police account for a greater proportion of the discrimination (17 per cent) experienced by European-born Muslim men than that faced by women (6 per cent) or Muslim men born abroad (10 per cent).

¹³⁵ See Table 57. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹³⁶ See Table 59. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Not only do expectations and experiences of discrimination undermine integration by limiting access to jobs, housing or education, discrimination also affects national identification¹³⁷ and general life satisfaction.¹³⁸ The European Social Survey shows that migrants and their descendants have a lower level of life satisfaction compared with the general population. While migration research suggests that the displacement that comes from migration accounts for the lower life-satisfaction levels of the first-generation migrants, analysis of the European Social Survey finds that perceptions of discrimination account for the lower life-satisfaction levels of the second generation:

despite the fact that they are born and socialized in host countries, the members of the second generations seem to be at least as dissatisfied with their lives as those of the first generation, when both of their parents are immigrants. This finding illustrates the specific psycho-social experience of second generation immigrants, and the fact, well documented in some qualitative research, that they regard their inferior living conditions as fundamentally unfair, more so than their parents (Handlin, 1966; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) [...] the lasting differences between life satisfaction of ethnic minorities and those of natives shrink (and sometimes disappear) when the perceived discrimination is introduced into the analysis. This is all the more true for Africans, Asians, and Turkish.¹³⁹

The qualitative data from the OSI survey and the focus groups point to the persistence of discrimination and prejudice in corroding the sense of belonging. For example, 13 out of the 59 Muslims who said they did not feel at home in Amsterdam referred to discrimination and racism. Respondents in Paris identified experiences of discrimination as important to making them feel that they did not belong. Discrimination was also cited as the main reason for those who did not want to be seen as French. In Berlin, issues of security, fear of racial attacks and anxiety about being made to feel an outsider were commonly cited by Muslims as barriers to greater identification with the city. The perception that one is not accepted as a real German by ethnic Germans re-emerged as a crucial obstacle to belonging in the focus group discussions in Berlin and Hamburg.

3.4 Interactions

There is renewed public policy interest in the level and nature of contact people have with those outside their own ethnic or religious group. This is underpinned by social contact theory, which suggests that intergroup contact leads to reduced levels of

¹³⁷ Maxwell, "Caribbean and South Asian identification with British society".

¹³⁸ Mirna Safi "Immigrants' life satisfaction in Europe between assimilation and discrimination", *European Sociological Review*, 2009 (hereafter, Safi, "Immigrants' life satisfaction"). See also M. Verkuyten, "Life satisfaction among ethnic minorities: The role of discrimination and group identification", *Social Indicators Research* 89, 2008, pp. 391–404.

¹³⁹ Safi, "Immigrants' life satisfaction".

prejudice.¹⁴⁰ As well, there is concern that the socio-economic integration of minorities is hindered by their lack of bridging capital, that is, networks and contact outside their own ethnic or religious group. Interest in levels of interaction also feeds into the discussion on whether minorities are living parallel lives, segregated and separate from the wider society. The OSI survey asks several questions that provide a picture not only of the levels of contacts across ethnic and religious boundaries but also the spaces where those interactions occur most frequently.¹⁴¹ Respondents were asked about meaningful contact, that is, contact that involves more than just a greeting and includes exchanges of information.

The OSI survey asked respondents about contact with those from a different ethnic group and religious group in eight different spaces. It also asked about contact with those from a different ethnic group in relation to 10 further areas. In general, in most spaces, levels of frequent contact with religious “others” is slightly lower than contact with ethnic “others”.¹⁴² Educational institutions and the workplace remain the place where Muslims and non-Muslims are the most likely to have “frequent” contact with ethnic and religious “others”. Levels of frequent inter-ethnic and inter-religious contact are highest among Muslims born in Europe. In contrast, a quarter of Muslim women born abroad rarely or never meet ethnic or religious others at work or school. This is likely to be a consequence of their high economic inactivity rates.

Shops come after the workplace and educational institutions as the place where respondents have the most frequent contacts with ethnic and religious “others”. Across all groups, public transport and public spaces such as parks are also important spaces for contact with people outside their ethnic group. For Muslim men born in Europe, sports and leisure facilities emerge as a far more important space for contact with ethnic or religious others than it is for other respondents. For Muslim women born abroad, street markets are a particular important space for inter-ethnic contact. Around a third of Muslim women and a quarter of non-Muslim women have frequent contact with others outside their ethnic or religious group at crèches and nurseries.

Neighbourhood groups and community centres are spaces where the majority of respondents rarely or never have contact with ethnic others. However, further analysis suggests that neighbourhood groups are important for frequent inter-ethnic interactions for a significant proportion of Muslim men born in Europe (23 per cent) and non-

¹⁴⁰ T. Pettigrew, “Intergroup contact theory”, *Annual Review of Psychology* 49, 2008, pp. 65–85.

¹⁴¹ The questionnaire asked respondents whether they met people from a different ethnic or religious background “daily”, “weekly”, “once a month”, “once a year” or “never” in a variety of different spaces. Contact that is “daily” and “weekly” is referred to as “frequent”; “occasional” contact is contact that takes place once a month, while contacts that take place once a year or never are identified as “rarely/not at all”.

¹⁴² The term ethnic or religious “other” is used to refer to a person who is from a different ethnic or religious group from the respondent.

Muslim men born outside Europe (21 per cent). Similarly, 23 per cent of Muslim men born in Europe do frequently meet ethnic “others” in community centres.

Frequent contact with ethnic and religious “others” at work, schools, shops and in public spaces such as transport and parks is to be expected. However, the OSI survey also found that people’s private homes are, for many, an important space for frequent contact with people outside their own ethnic or religious group. This is particularly true for female respondents. Over half of non-Muslim women born outside Europe (51 per cent) and Muslim women born in Europe (51 per cent) had frequent contact with people outside their ethnic group at home. This is also true of 46 per cent of non-Muslim women born in Europe and 43 per cent of Muslim men born in Europe. Among Muslims born abroad there is greater polarisation. Around a third frequently meet ethnic others at home, but around a quarter “rarely or never” do so. For contact with “religious” others, Muslims born overseas are slightly more likely to have contact “rarely/not at all” or occasionally (35 per cent) than to have “frequent contact” (27 per cent).

The OSI research finds that cities are increasingly involved in supporting dialogue between different religious traditions and communities. In Antwerp, the city supported inter-religious dialogue through establishing a working group called Cordoba with representatives from the six recognised faith groups – Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Anglicans and Orthodox – and people of no faith. In Amsterdam, the programme “Wij Amsterdammers” aims at stimulating debate on Islam both in the Muslim community and between Muslims and non-Muslims. Initiatives taken to promote dialogue between different groups include the creation of the Religious-Secular Circle in Slotervaart, which consisted of a series of meetings during which people of various religious convictions, as well as non-religious people, exchanged ideas and debated issues related to religion and society, in order to enhance mutual understanding and tolerance. In Leicester, the city council supports the Leicester Council of Faiths, which includes in its membership Baha’is, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Jews, Muslims and Sikhs.¹⁴³ There is also an informal Faith Leaders Forum convened by the Bishop of Leicester (and including the police, council representation and other agencies), which provides a crucial platform for the discussion of more sensitive and controversial matters concerning faith communities. Political problems and issues of potential tension between communities have been tackled during the meetings. The presence of a broad range of networks and organisations has meant that when crises have occurred, with a potential for local spill-over (for example after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005, or the rise in Hindu-Muslim tension after ethnic conflict in Gujarat, India), channels of communication have been available for community leaders to meet and discuss issues – even if they agree to disagree.

¹⁴³ See the Council of Faiths website at <http://www.leicestercounciloffaiths.org.uk/index.html> (accessed November 2009).

3.5 Key Findings

The OSI research finds the majority of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents felt that people of different backgrounds got on well together in their local areas and that people were willing to help each other in their neighbourhoods. Muslim respondents tended to feel that their neighbourhood was close-knit – more than non-Muslim respondents. Levels of trust are generally high, but work is needed on increasing trust among younger people.

A shared commitment to the values of the EU is a strong theme in European integration policy. The results from the OSI research are mixed. On the one hand, in responses to the question of whether people in the neighbourhood had shared values, the outcomes are quite negative: the majority of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents did not think this was the case. However, both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents identified similar values as being important to the country they live in: respect for law, freedom of expression and equal opportunities were accorded the highest recognition by both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. Among Muslim respondents, respect for all religions was more important than it was for non-Muslims. In light of the obligation in the Charter of Fundamental Rights on the Union to respect religious diversity, there may be a need to focus more attention in this area.

These results present a complex picture, suggesting that a sense of shared values is not needed for people of different backgrounds to get along and help their neighbours. However, there appears to be a greater correlation between levels of trust and perceptions of whether people are willing to work together to improve the neighbourhood, as well as a belief that people in neighbourhood share the same values.

It is clear from the data across all 11 cities that, for Muslims, local and city-level belonging is stronger than national belonging. This supports the approach in the EU of supporting cities' approaches to integration. For non-Muslims, levels of national belonging are greater than, or around the same as, city or local belonging. While there were high levels of cultural identification as nationals, Muslims did not feel that they were viewed as such by others. Cultural identification increases with integration in other areas, such as employment and education. In light of the debate on the headscarf across Europe, particularly in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, it is important to note that the OSI survey found that visible religious identity or level of practice does not affect cultural identification with the state.

Muslim and non-Muslim respondents have similar views about the extent of racial discrimination. However, their perceptions of the levels of religious discrimination differ significantly. Among Muslim respondents, European-born Muslims, particularly women, were more likely to perceive higher levels of religious discrimination than those born abroad. In general this discrimination comes from the public. However, for European-born Muslims, the police are identified as a key source of unfair treatment and discrimination. The persistence of racism and discrimination in the experiences of Muslims and their role as a barrier to belonging – and therefore integration – indicates

that more action is needed to ensure that Europe lives up to its promise of being an area where the values of pluralism and tolerance prevail. Furthermore, the results from this and other research suggest that levels of religious discrimination are increasing and not decreasing in some states.

The results also suggest significant levels of interaction with people of different backgrounds. Among Muslim respondents, levels of frequent inter-ethnic and inter-religious contact are highest among Muslims born in Europe. While frequent contact with ethnic and religious “others” at work, schools, shops and in public spaces such as transport and parks is to be expected, more surprising perhaps, is the finding that people’s private homes are, for many, an important space for frequent contact with people outside their own ethnic or religious group. This is particularly true for female respondents. The majority of European-born Muslim women (51 per cent) had frequent contact with people outside their ethnic group at home. The results run contrary to the view that Muslims live parallel or segregated lives or do not feel a sense of belonging or attachment to the city and country where they live. It suggests that discrimination remains an important barrier to belonging but one that many are overcoming.