"Bad Analysis Makes for Bad Policy" in Uzbekistan -- Expert

The following is a summary of an OSI Forum, "Who Lost Uzbekistan? The Challenge of U.S. Engagement in Central Asia," that was held on May 19, 2004 at OSI's offices in New York. The summary is reprinted courtesy of EurasiaNet, the news and information website of OSI's Central Eurasia Project.

A leading expert on Uzbekistan said authorities in Tashkent are interested only in ensuring that "a small self-enriching elite stays in power," adding that official policies were fostering radical domestic opposition to President Islam Karimov’s administration. The expert also criticized the U.S. stance towards Karimov, saying "bad analysis makes for bad policy."

David Lewis, the Central Asia project director of the International Crisis Group, casts Karimov as intransigent in the face of growing popular discontent. In recent years, the Uzbek government has maintained rigid control over the country’s economy, while at the same time drastically curtailing individual liberties. The international community, including foreign governments and lending institutions, has attempted to exert pressure on Uzbekistan to reform. Though Tashkent has made repeated promises to liberalize, it has taken virtually no action to implement changes. The administration is "attempting the impossible: reforming the system without changing anything at all," Lewis said during a May 19 forum sponsored by the New York-based Open Society Institute. "All the moves [by Uzbek authorities] over the last 10 months have embedded an economic elite."

Lewis maintains that Karimov’s administration now has "no popular legitimacy." Karimov’s preference to clamp down further in the face of what the government claims is an international terrorist threat is causing frustration among the population to grow. "[Uzbek] Government policy is working in reverse to encourage radicalism," he said.

Lewis asserted that the late March attacks that left at least 45 people dead in Tashkent and Bukhara were rooted in domestic discontent, and were a reflection of "widespread hatred of [Uzbek] security forces." He added that many older Uzbeks considered radical anti-government action as justifiable because of "years of abuse" by state security forces. "Oppression has sparked interest in [radical] groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbeksitan," Lewis said.

"Key trading towns have become dead ends for young men seeking a way out," he continued. "Inevitably, some become political."

The United States has abetted the rise of domestic radicalism in Uzbekistan because of its unstinting public support for Karimov, who, since the September 11 terrorism tragedy, has emerged as the Bush administration’s key strategic ally in Central Asia, Lewis suggested. US officials have said they are using quiet diplomacy to encourage Karimov to change. If this is the case, Lewis said, such quiet diplomacy isn’t working. Indeed, it could be damaging US interests in the country.

"When there is no public condemnation of [human rights] abuses, the perception on the ground is that the U.S. and Uzbek government are together," he said. "The situation [in Tashkent] is getting more difficult and the United States needs to be more open in dealing with Uzbekistan."

Lewis said that U.S. tolerance for Karimov’s hardline practices was based on erroneous assumptions held by American policy-makers. Among the "myths" accepted as truth in Washington is the belief that Karimov is "an embattled reformer" at heart, Lewis said. Many Bush administration officials also see Uzbek repressive practices as the best available option for containing Islamic radicalism.

All the U.S. support does is reinforce "the self-delusion of the Uzbek government that its policies are right," he said.

Lewis said international governments and lending institutions should have done more to compel better Uzbek reform behavior. Often, he said, the international community would appear satisfied by "cosmetic" changes. Instead, the international community should have, from the start, made assistance projects conditional on reforms.

At present, the U.S. State Department is considering whether or not to certify Uzbekistan as making progress on curbing human rights abuses. Millions of dollars in US assistance are riding on certification. Yet, recent Uzbek government action only made the State Department’s decision dilemma tougher. In recent months, Karimov’s administration has acted to dramatically curtail non-governmental organization activity, going so far as to close down the Open Society Institute’s Tashkent branch. (EurasiaNet is published under the Open Society Institute’s auspices).

Secretary of State "Colin Powell gritted his teeth and found enough reason to extend aid in 2003," Lewis said. "In 2004, the crumbs at the bottom of the [Uzbek government] barrel are not even present to justify [certification]."